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IS HATE A FORM OF COMMERCE?  THE QUESTIONABLE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF FEDERAL “HATE CRIME” 
LEGISLATION 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 1998, the stories of two gruesome murders grabbed headlines across the 
United States.  In the early morning hours of June 7, three white supremacists 
from Jasper, Texas, let a black man, James Byrd Jr., hitch a ride with them in 
the back of their pickup truck.1  The men drove Byrd to a secluded area, where 
they beat him, chained him to the bumper of their vehicle and dragged him for 
three miles along an asphalt road.2  Medical examiners believed that Byrd was 
still alive while the friction of the road was shredding his clothes and peeling 
off his skin.3  He was finally killed when a collision with a concrete culvert 
ripped his head and torso from his body.4 
Four months later, on October 7, two men from Laramie, Wyoming, 
kidnapped Matthew Shepard, a gay college student, beat him mercilessly, tied 
him to a fence like a scarecrow and left him to die.5  Shepard was found 
eighteen hours later, still clinging to life.6  He remained in a coma for five days 
before he finally died.7  The father of one of the murderers admitted that his 
son became enraged after Shepard made a pass at him earlier in the evening.8 
These senseless acts of violence sparked politicians and civil rights 
activists to call for stronger federal laws against these so-called “hate crimes.”9  
 
 1. Richard Stewart, Trio Charged in Jasper Slaying, HOUSTON CHRON., June 10, 1998, at 
1. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Richard Stewart et al., Jasper Pulled into the National Spotlight, HOUSTON CHRON., 
June 11, 1998, at 25.  Evidence that Byrd was still alive at the time he was chained to the truck 
led prosecutors to charge the defendants with kidnapping, which made the murder a capital 
offense.  See id.  This allowed the jury to sentence two of the defendants to death.  See Bruce 
Tomaso, 2nd Jasper Killer Sentenced to Death, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 24, 1999, at 1A. 
 4. Stewart, supra note 1. 
 5. Patrick O’Driscoll, Wyo. Attack Stuns Campus, State, USA TODAY, Oct. 12, 1998, at 3A. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Charisse Jones, Gay Student’s Brutal Death Stokes Hate Crime Debate, USA TODAY, 
Oct. 13, 1998, at 1A. 
 8. Jim Hughes & David Olinger, Beating Wasn’t a Hate Crime, Suspect’s Family Says, 
DENV. POST, Oct. 11, 1998, at A10. 
 9. See O’Driscoll, supra note 5; Sonya Ross, President Appeals to Congress to Pass Hate 
Crime Legislation, THE BATON ROUGE ADVOC., Sept. 14, 2000, at 5A.  The term “hate crime” is 
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One of the most outspoken advocates of a federal hate crime law has been 
Senator Edward Kennedy.10  He has attempted several times to get a bill 
through Congress that would make bias-motivated violence a federal offense.11 
According to Kennedy and other civil rights activists, federal action is 
required because existing laws are insufficient to address the widespread, 
national problem of hate crimes.12  Although forty-eight states already have 
hate crime laws on their books, provisions vary significantly from one state to 
the next.13  Hate crime law advocates argue that a uniform federal law is 
necessary to eradicate the inconsistencies among state statutes.14  Furthermore, 
they contend that federal law currently does not reach far enough to protect 
people like James Byrd and Matthew Shepard.15  Under existing federal law, it 
is a crime to willfully injure or intimidate someone, based on that person’s 
race, color, religion or national origin, and because such person is or has been 
engaging in a “federally protected activity.”16  Kennedy’s proposed legislation 
would expand the existing law in two ways.  First, it would extend to crimes 
based on gender, sexual orientation and disability.17  Second, it would not 
 
somewhat of a misnomer since it does not refer to all crimes motivated by hatred, but only to 
those crimes motivated by a particular bias toward the victim’s class.  See John S. Baker, Jr., 
United States v. Morrison and Other Arguments Against Federal ‘Hate Crime’ Legislation, 80 
B.U. L. REV. 1191, 1206-08 (2000).  However, in keeping with custom, this Comment uses the 
term “hate crimes” to mean bias-motivated crimes. 
 10. See, e.g., Edward M. Kennedy, Hate Crimes: The Unfinished Business of America, 44 
FEB. BOSTON B. J. 6 (2000). 
 11. The original version of Kennedy’s legislation was called the Hate Crimes Prevention 
Act.  See S. 622, 106th Cong. (1999); S. 1529, 105th Cong. (1997).  The bill was revised in 2000 
and reintroduced as the Local Law Enforcement Enhancement Act.  S. 2550, 106th Cong. §§ 
1501-10 (2000). 
 12. Kennedy, supra note 10, at 6.  FBI evidence suggests, however, that the proliferation of 
hate crimes may not be as severe as some civil rights activists suggest.  See Baker, supra note 9, 
at 1201-04. 
 13. For a comprehensive list of state hate crime laws, see LU-IN WANG, HATE CRIMES LAW 
app. B1-41 (1999).  For a comparative look at state hate crime statutes, see Anti-Defamation 
League, Map of State Statutes, available at http://www.adl.org/frames/front_99hatecrime.html 
(last visited Feb. 2, 2001). 
 14. See, e.g., Murad Kalam, Hate Crime Prevention, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 593, 604 (2000). 
 15. See Kennedy, supra note 10, at 22; Democratic National Committee, News Release, 
7/9/98 – Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 1998, available at 
http://www.democrats.org/archive/rel1998/re1070998.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2001). 
 16. 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2) (1994).  Such “federally protected activities” under the statute 
include enrolling in a public school, enjoying a state-sanctioned privilege or benefit, applying for 
employment, serving on a jury, traveling in interstate commerce, and enjoying the goods and 
services of businesses that serve the public, such as inns, restaurants and places of entertainment.  
Id.  This law was passed in 1968 in response to attacks on civil rights workers in the South.  See 
Kennedy, supra note 10, at 6. 
 17. S. 19, 107th Cong. § 107(a) (2001). 
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require a prosecutor to show that the victim was engaging in a federally 
protected activity.18 
In 2000, Senator Kennedy’s bill came close to becoming law.  In June, the 
Senate approved adding Kennedy’s legislation to a defense appropriation bill.19  
On September 13, in what seemed to be a stunning victory for civil rights 
activists, the House also passed a bipartisan motion to add Kennedy’s 
amendment to the defense bill.20  This victory, however, proved to be 
temporary.  Congress stripped the hate crime language from the defense bill 
one month later.21  On October 30, President Clinton begrudgingly signed the 
bill into law without Kennedy’s hate crime provision.22 
Because of the bill’s near-passage, and in light of the fact that Democrats 
picked up congressional seats in the 2000 election, it is likely that the hate 
crime debate will heat up again.23  In one of President Clinton’s final speeches 
in office, he urged Congress to pass hate crime legislation.24  Lawmakers 
heeded Clinton’s plea.  On the first day of business following President George 
W. Bush’s inauguration, the defeated hate crime bill was reintroduced in the 
Senate as the Local Law Enforcement Enhancement Act of 2001.25 
The bill’s previous failures, however, were no accident.  Laws against hate 
crimes have drawn intense opposition and have been criticized on many 
grounds.  One common argument against hate crime laws is that existing laws 
against murder and assault are sufficient in dealing with hate-motivated 
violence.26  When questioned about his state’s failure to pass tougher hate 
crime legislation in the wake of the James Byrd murder, then Texas Governor 
George W. Bush pointed out that the perpetrators in that case were caught, 
tried and sentenced to death without the assistance of a special hate crime 
 
 18. See id.; Kennedy, supra note 10, at 6. 
 19. 146 CONG. REC. S5434 (daily ed. June 20, 2000). 
 20. 146 CONG. REC. H7532-41 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 2000).  The vote in the House breaks 
down as follows: Among Democrats, 190 voted for the motion and 17 voted against; among 
Republicans, 41 voted in favor and 174 voted against.  See Final Vote Results for Roll Call 471, 
available at http://clerkweb.house.gov/cgi-bin/vote.exe?year=2000&rollnumber=471 (last visited 
Feb. 2, 2001). 
 21. Anti-Hate Language Dropped From Bill, FT. LAUDERDALE SUN-SENTINEL, Oct. 6, 
2000, at 13A. 
 22. President Signs Defense Upgrade, TULSA WORLD, Oct. 31, 2000, at 3. 
 23. See Deb Price, Election Gives Mixed Results for Gays, THE DETROIT NEWS, Nov. 13, 
2000, at 9. 
 24. See Philippe Debeusscher, Clinton Urges Congress to Pass Hate Crimes Bill on King 
Holiday, AGENCE FR.- PRESSE, Jan. 16, 2001, available at 2001 WL 2321634. 
 25. S. 19, 107th Cong. (2001).  Hereinafter, unless otherwise indicated, all references to a 
federal “hate crime bill” or “hate crime legislation” refer to this proposal. 
 26. See, e.g., Mona Charen, Trying to Win Ugly, available at http://www.townhall.com/ 
columnists/monacharen/printmc20001027.shtml (Oct. 27, 2000). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
976 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 45:973 
law.27  Hate crime laws are also criticized on the grounds that they criminalize 
mere thoughts or that they give special treatment to certain classes of 
citizens.28  Some conservative Christian groups are strongly opposed to giving 
special protection to homosexuals and have lobbied vigorously against the 
federal bill.29 
Hate crime laws have also been attacked on constitutional grounds.  In 
1992, the Supreme Court struck down a St. Paul, Minnesota, ordinance that 
criminalized certain bias-motivated speech.30  The Court found the ordinance 
violated the First Amendment.31  The next year, however, the Court upheld a 
Wisconsin statute that provides for enhanced sentences for criminals who 
choose their victims based on race, religion, color, disability, sexual 
orientation, national origin or ancestry.32  A federal law would face even more 
constitutional scrutiny, though, since it would extend federal jurisdiction into 
areas that have traditionally been of state concern. 
With this in mind, the drafters of the federal hate crime bill have included 
findings that attempt to show that Congress has authority under the 
Constitution to enact such legislation.33  Specifically, the findings state that the 
legislation is consistent with Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause, 
which grants the power to regulate commerce among the several states.34  The 
language also suggests that the bill is a proper exercise of congressional 
authority under the Thirteenth Amendment, which empowers Congress to 
 
 27. The 2000 Campaign; 2nd Presidential Debate Between Gov. Bush and Vice President Al 
Gore, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2000, at A22. 
 28. See, e.g., Charen, supra note 26; Clyde Haberman, Finding Flaws in the Logic of Bias 
Laws, N.Y. TIMES, March 12, 1999, at B1.  In testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 
Judy Shepard, the mother of Matthew Shepard, gave a stirring rebuttal to these two arguments.  
See Combating Hate Crimes: Promoting a Responsible Role for the Federal Government: 
Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 27-30 (1999) (statement of Judy 
Shepard). 
 29. See, e.g., Traditional Values Coalition, Traditional Values Coalition Condemns Passage 
of Senate Hate Crimes Amendment, available at http://www.traditionalvalues.org/pr062000.html 
(June 20, 2000). 
 30. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).  The ordinance at issue stated: 
“Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation, characterization or 
graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has 
reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, 
color, creed, religion or gender commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a 
misdemeanor.”  Id. at 380. 
 31. Id. at 391 (holding that the “First Amendment does not permit St. Paul to impose special 
prohibitions on those speakers who express views on disfavored subjects”). 
 32. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993).  The statute at issue can be found at WIS. 
STAT. ANN. § 939.645(1)(b) (West 1996). 
 33. S. 19, 107th Cong. § 102 (2001). 
 34. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
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enact appropriate legislation to enforce the ban on slavery and involuntary 
servitude.35 
The courts, however, may be hesitant to embrace these arguments.  On 
May 15, 2000, the Supreme Court handed down a decision in United States v. 
Morrison,36 which, following in the heels of the landmark case of United 
States v. Lopez in 1995,37 casts serious doubts on how far Congress can go in 
controlling violent crime without running afoul of the Constitution.  In 
Morrison, the Court struck down a provision of the Violence Against Women 
Act of 1994 that gave rape victims the right to sue their attackers in federal 
court.38  The Court ruled that the law was an unconstitutional extension of 
Congress’s Commerce Clause power.39  The Court also held that the statute 
was unconstitutional under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which 
gives Congress authority to protect citizens from unequal treatment by the 
states.40 
During the Senate debates on the hate crime legislation in June 2000, 
Senator Orrin Hatch recognized that Kennedy’s bill raises “serious 
constitutional questions, especially in light of [Morrison].”41  He added that the 
law would likely be found unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause, the 
Fourteenth Amendment and the Thirteenth Amendment.42  Senator Robert 
Byrd was also concerned that the law would not withstand constitutional 
scrutiny.43  He stated that relying on the Thirteenth Amendment was a 
“tenuous argument,” and he also recognized the limits Morrison put on 
Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment authority.44  Senator John Warner followed 
by addressing the Commerce Clause issue.45  He stated that the Morrison 
decision places “serious boundaries” on Congress’s Commerce Clause power 
and concluded that he had “serious concerns” about the constitutionality of 
Kennedy’s amendment.46 
This Comment addresses the concerns raised by the senators.  It calls into 
question the constitutionality of the pending hate crime legislation and 
determines whether the bill, if passed into law, could withstand a challenge in 
court.  Specifically, this Comment addresses whether the bill can be justified 
 
 35. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
 36. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 37. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 38. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994). 
 39. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 619. 
 40. Id. at 627. 
 41. 146 CONG. REC. S5426 (daily ed. June 20, 2000). 
 42. Id.  Senator Hatch also doubted that the bill could withstand a challenge under the First 
Amendment.  Id.  That particular issue, however, is not addressed in this Comment. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. 146 CONG. REC. S5427 (daily ed. June 20, 2000). 
 46. Id. 
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under the Commerce Clause, the Fourteenth Amendment or the Thirteenth 
Amendment.  Although the findings in the hate crime bill do not specifically 
invoke the Fourteenth Amendment, this amendment warrants discussion since 
it has often been used to justify federal civil rights laws.47 
Section II of this Comment briefly traces the case law concerning each of 
the aforementioned constitutional provisions.  Section III closely examines the 
Morrison case and shows how it has changed the Court’s interpretations of 
both the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment.  Section IV 
analyzes the impact the Morrison decision has had on lower courts’ 
understandings of the Commerce Clause.  In particular, it demonstrates various 
methods courts have used to distinguish Morrison.  Section V introduces the 
Local Law Enforcement Enhancement Act of 2001 and analyzes its 
constitutionality in light of Morrison and later Commerce Clause cases.  This 
section also demonstrates why the bill is beyond the scope of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Furthermore, this section examines whether the bill can be 
upheld under the Thirteenth Amendment.  Finally, Section VI concludes that 
the legislation contains severe constitutional defects and should be abandoned 
as a means to combat hate crimes. 
II. HISTORY 
A. The Commerce Clause 
The Commerce Clause is by far the most widely used source of authority 
to justify federal criminal and civil rights laws.  This clause gives Congress the 
power to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several 
States, and with the Indian Tribes.”48  In the 1824 case of Gibbons v. Ogden, 
the Supreme Court established that the Commerce Clause granted Congress 
broad legislative power.49  In Chief Justice Marshall’s often-cited opinion, the 
Court took an expansive view of what the term “commerce” entailed: 
“Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more: it is 
intercourse.”50  The Court held that Congress’s Commerce Clause power does 
not stop at the boundary lines of each state but can reach matters occurring 
within a state so long as such activities have some commercial connection with 
another state.51  Marshall noted, however, that Congress cannot regulate 
 
 47. See GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 920-21 (13th 
ed. 1997). 
 48. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 49. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, 187-90 (1824). The Court held that Congress 
had authority to supercede a state law when it granted Thomas Gibbons a license to operate a 
steamboat ferry between New York and New Jersey.  Id. at 239-40. 
 50. Id. at 189. 
 51. Id. at 195-96. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2001] IS HATE A FORM OF COMMERCE? 979 
activities that are purely intrastate—that do not extend to or affect other 
states.52 
The Gibbons decision left no bright-line definition of “interstate” or 
“intrastate,” making it difficult for future courts to determine when Congress 
was acting within its constitutional authority.  This was not an immediate 
problem, however.  At the time of Gibbons, most commerce in the United 
States was local.  Thus, Congress had few motives for using its Commerce 
Clause authority, and courts were given few opportunities to clarify Gibbons.53  
This changed, however, in the late 1800s, as rapid industrialization and the 
development of railroads reformed the economic structure of the United States.  
Commerce became more nationalized, and Congress came under increasing 
pressure to pass stronger regulations.54  New federal laws inevitably led to 
legal challenges.  Thus, courts were once again called on to determine when 
Congress had acted within its constitutional bounds and when it had gone too 
far. 
The Commerce Clause jurisprudence that developed followed along two 
lines.  On the one hand, federal laws that sought to directly regulate interstate 
activity were generally found to be consistent with Congress’s Commerce 
Clause authority.  The Supreme Court, relying on the Marshall Court’s 
expansive definition of “commerce” as “intercourse,”55 upheld laws that 
sought to regulate the channels, methods, instruments or goods of interstate 
commerce.56 
A famous example of this approach can be found in Houston, East & West 
Texas Railway Co. v. United States (the “Shreveport Rate” case).57  In that 
case, the Court upheld a federal order regulating the rates charged on a railway 
line that ran between Texas and Shreveport, Louisiana.58  An important aspect 
of the case was that one of the rates regulated was on an intrastate route.59  In 
 
 52. Id. at 195. 
 53. See Alexander Dombrowsky, Comment, Whether the Constitutionality of the Violence 
Against Women Act Will Further Federal Protection From Sexual Orientation Crimes, 54 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 587, 590 (2000). 
 54. See id. 
 55. See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) at 189-90. 
 56. Courts later recognized this as two distinct categories: regulations of the “channels” of 
interstate commerce and regulations of the “instrumentalities.”  See United States v. Morrison, 
529 U.S. 598, 608-09 (2000). 
 57. 234 U.S. 342 (1914). 
 58. Id. 
 59. See id. at 350.  The railway company charged a higher rate to carry articles from 
Shreveport into Texas than it did to carry articles across equal distances within Texas.  Id. at 349.  
When the government demanded that the rates be equal, the railway company argued 
unsuccessfully that equalizing the rates would require raising the rates on intrastate lines within 
Texas, and thus the order was an unconstitutional extension of federal authority into intrastate 
commerce.  Id. at 349-50. 
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cases where the channels or objects of interstate commerce are regulated 
directly, the Court has been willing to let congressional authority extend into 
the interior of the state.  As Marshall noted in Gibbons, Congress’s Commerce 
Clause authority does not cease at the border of each state.60  For example, in 
Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, the Court upheld Congress’s authority to 
confiscate eggs shipped in violation of the Pure Food and Drug Act, after they 
had already crossed state lines and were sitting in a baker’s storeroom.61 
Another important development of this broad grant of authority, as 
demonstrated in the Hipolite Egg case, is that the Court has allowed Congress 
to regulate channels of interstate commerce even when the purpose of the 
regulation is non-economic.  Other examples are Champion v. Ames, in which 
the Court upheld a federal law banning the sale of lottery tickets across state 
lines,62 and Hoke v. United States, in which the Court upheld a federal law 
prohibiting the taking of a woman across state lines for immoral purposes.63 
The other arm of Congress’s Commerce Clause power is the authority to 
regulate activities that are not interstate in themselves, but which have some 
effect on interstate commerce.  Marshall recognized this authority in Gibbons, 
but left open the question of what kind of “effect” on interstate commerce 
needed to be present to make federal intervention constitutional.  Before the 
Great Depression of the 1930s, the Court took a very narrow view of this 
authority.  The Court ruled that Congress could only use its Commerce Clause 
power to regulate activities that had a direct effect on interstate commerce.64 
During the Depression, this “direct effect” test led the Court to thwart 
many of President Roosevelt’s New Deal programs.65  Frustrated by the 
Court’s consistent rejection of his economic recovery acts, Roosevelt unveiled 
his “Court-packing” plan, in which he threatened to nominate up to six 
additional judges to the Supreme Court in order to obtain a favorable 
 
 60. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, 194-96 (1824). 
 61. Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45 (1911). 
 62. Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903). 
 63. Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913). 
 64. One of the most extreme examples of this restriction can be found in United States v. 
E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).  In that case, the Court found that Congress could not 
prohibit a sugar refinery from buying out its competitors, even though the acquisition would give 
that one business control over ninety-eight percent of the nation’s sugar refining.  Id.  The Court 
concluded that the purchase would have an indirect, rather than a direct, effect on interstate 
commerce, and thus was beyond the reach of Congress’s Commerce Clause power.  Id. at 17. 
 65. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (invalidating a federal 
regulation of maximum working hours and minimum wages for coal miners); A.L.A. Schechter 
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (prohibiting the President from imposing 
rules of fair competition on a poultry farmer who did all of his business within one state); R.R. 
Ret. Bd. v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330 (1935) (invalidating a federally mandated retirement 
and pension plan for railroad workers). 
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majority.66  Although the Senate ultimately rejected his idea,67 the Court heard 
Roosevelt’s message loud and clear and began to modify its interpretation of 
the Commerce Clause.68  This led to the watershed case of NLRB v. Jones & 
Laughlin Steel Corp., in which the Court abandoned the “direct effect” test in 
favor of what became known as a “substantial effects” test.69  Under this new 
test, Congress was given the authority to regulate all activities that have “such 
a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that their control is 
essential or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens or 
obstructions.”70 
In Wickard v. Filburn, the Court took the holding of Jones & Laughlin one 
step further, stating that Congress can regulate an entire class of activities 
when those activities, taken in the aggregate, would have a substantial effect 
on interstate commerce.71  The appellee in Wickard was a farmer who violated 
a federal regulation by growing excess wheat on his private farm.72  Congress 
had passed a law restricting wheat production in an effort to keep wheat prices 
stable.73  The farmer argued that since he used the excess wheat solely on his 
own farm, his activity would have little if any effect on interstate commerce.74  
The Court, however, found that the activity was within Congress’s Commerce 
Clause power, for although the farmer’s activities alone might not substantially 
affect interstate commerce, a wide epidemic of farmers growing excess wheat 
for personal use would have a substantial effect on interstate commerce by 
lowering the demand for wheat nationwide, causing wheat prices to plummet.75 
The Wickard decision turned the Commerce Clause into a “catch-all” 
clause that could be used to justify almost any exercise of federal authority.  
When all else failed, Congress could simply say the magic words “Commerce 
 
 66. See WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 132-34 (1995). 
 67. See id. at 147-54. 
 68. According to conventional wisdom, the dramatic change in the Court’s position was due 
to Justice Roberts’ decision to side with the pro-Roosevelt justices in order to save the Supreme 
Court from the Court-packing plan.  See, e.g., Michael Ariens, A Thrice Told Tale, or Felix the 
Cat, 107 HARV. L. REV. 620 (1994).  This claim, however, may be more legend than fact.  See 
GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 47, at 185 n.10 (citing contrasting authorities supporting and 
debunking the Roberts story). 
 69. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
 70. Id. at 37. 
 71. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
 72. Id. at 114-15.  The regulation at issue was passed under a provision of the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act of 1938.  7 U.S.C. § 1335 (1994). 
 73. The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 directed the Secretary of Agriculture to 
proclaim a national acreage allotment for each year’s crop of wheat, which is then apportioned to 
the states and their counties, and is eventually broken up into allotments for individual farms.  See 
Wickard, 317 U.S. at 115 (citing 7 U.S.C. § 1335). 
 74. Id. at 119. 
 75. Id. at 127-29. 
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Clause” in order to defend a federal law against a constitutional challenge.  
This was most apparent in the 1964 Supreme Court cases of Heart of Atlanta 
Motel, Inc. v. United States76 and Katzenbach v. McClung.77  At issue in those 
cases was Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibited certain 
business owners from discriminating against customers on grounds of race, 
color, religion or national origin.78  The Court sidestepped the issue of whether 
the law could be justified under the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of 
“equal protection” when applied against private business owners.79  The Court 
instead held that the act was valid under the Commerce Clause.  Using the 
Wickard aggregation principle, the Court in Heart of Atlanta concluded that 
racism at hotels, if left unregulated, would have a substantial effect on 
interstate commerce by discouraging blacks from interstate travel.80  Although 
there were no formal congressional findings that such an effect existed, the 
Court held that as long as there was a “rational basis” to find the connection, 
the law was a proper exercise of Commerce Clause power.81  The same 
“rational basis” approach was used in McClung, where the Court approved 
Congress’s power to prevent discrimination at a barbecue stand in Alabama.82 
After Heart of Atlanta and McClung, Congress began using its broad 
Commerce Clause authority to further expand the scope of federal criminal 
law.  A new breed of federal crimes appeared, covering areas such as gun 
control,83 racketeering84 and drugs.85  As long as Congress could articulate 
some rational connection between the regulated activity and interstate 
commerce, the Supreme Court was unwilling to interfere.  Perhaps the most 
 
 76. 379 U.S. 241 (1964). 
 77. 379 U.S. 294 (1964). 
 78. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000a-6 (1994).  The statute states that “[a]ll persons shall be 
entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, 
and accommodations of any place of public accommodation . . . without discrimination or 
segregation on the grounds of race, color, religion, or national origin.”  Id. § 2000a(a). 
 79. For a federal law to be valid under the Fourteenth Amendment, it must be directed 
toward a state or a state actor.  See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 620-27 (2000).  This 
“state action” requirement is discussed infra Section II.B.  Justice Douglas, in his concurring 
opinion, found the law to be valid under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, arguing that the 
rights of citizens to travel freely should not be equated with the rights that protect cattle, fruit and 
other articles of commerce shipped across state lines.  Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 279 
(Douglas, J., concurring). 
 80. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 253. 
 81. Id. at 258.  The Court concluded that the testimony of black citizens before 
congressional committees formed the requisite rational basis by presenting “overwhelming 
evidence that discrimination at hotels and motels impedes interstate commerce.”  Id. at 253. 
 82. McClung, 379 U.S. at 303-04. 
 83. 18 U.S.C. § 922 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). 
 84. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1994). 
 85. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841-63 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). 
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significant example of judicial deference was found in Perez v. United States.86  
In this case, the Court upheld a federal law against extortionate credit 
transactions, or “loan sharking.”87  The Court found that although loan 
sharking may primarily take place on the local level, the practices are generally 
controlled by nationally organized criminal syndicates.88  The criminal 
activities of these syndicates, in turn, create a detrimental effect on interstate 
commerce by siphoning away money that would otherwise be used for 
legitimate commercial purposes.89  Thus, like the wheat farmer in Wickard, the 
loan shark in Perez engaged in a class of activities that had a substantial effect 
on interstate commerce.90  Justice Stewart, in his dissent, pointed out that this 
“cost of crime” argument could be extended to bring virtually all criminal 
activity under federal jurisdiction.91 
The runaway train of Commerce Clause power, however, would come to a 
screeching halt in the 1995 case of United States v. Lopez.92  The law at issue 
in Lopez was the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, which made it a federal 
crime to possess a gun within one thousand feet of a school.93  In striking down 
the statute, the Court laid out the analytical framework it would later use in 
Morrison.  Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing the majority opinion, divided 
Congress’s Commerce Clause authority into three categories: (1) Congress can 
regulate the channels of interstate commerce; (2) Congress can regulate and 
protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce—persons or things that 
travel in interstate commerce; and (3) Congress can regulate activities that, 
when taken in the aggregate, have a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce.94 
The Court easily found that the Gun-Free School Zones Act did not fall in 
either of the first two categories.95  To be constitutional, then, the statute had to 
pass the “substantial effects” test.  The Court found the law did not pass this 
test for at least four reasons.  First, the activity Congress sought to regulate—
the possession of guns near schools—was not economic in nature.96  Second, 
the statute contained no “jurisdictional element” that would have required the 
 
 86. 402 U.S. 146 (1971). 
 87. 18 U.S.C. § 892 (1994). 
 88. Perez, 402 U.S. at 155. 
 89. Id. at 156-57. 
 90. Id. at 154. 
 91. Id. at 157-58 (1971) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 92. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 93. The original version of the law made it a federal crime “to possess a firearm at a place 
that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone.” 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(q)(1)(A) (1994). 
 94. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59. 
 95. Id. at 559. 
 96. Id. at 561.  The Court stated that the statute “has nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or any 
sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms.”  Id. 
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prosecution to prove as an element of the crime that the defendant’s activity 
had some connection with interstate commerce.97  Third, there were no formal 
congressional findings indicating that possessing a gun in a school zone had a 
substantial effect on interstate commerce.98  It is not particularly surprising that 
Congress neglected to include formal findings, though, since the Court had 
stressed in Heart of Atlanta and McClung that such findings were unnecessary 
for a judicial determination of a substantial effect, so long as there was a 
“rational basis” to find a connection.99  Finally, the Court determined that the 
link between the possession of a gun near a school and any effect on interstate 
commerce was attenuated.100  The government, as it had done in Perez, 
attempted to use a “cost of crime” argument that concluded that guns near 
schools affected interstate commerce by hindering national productivity.101  
The Court stated that this line of reasoning would require the Court to “pile 
inference upon inference in a manner that would . . . convert congressional 
authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort 
retained by the States.”102  Thus, according to the Court, the law did not give 
due reverence to the principles of dual federalism on which the Constitution 
was founded.103 
After Lopez, it was clear that the “substantial effects” test does indeed have 
its limits, and the Court left four guidelines in determining where these limits 
lie.  Lopez, however, did not indicate which of these four factors were the more 
relevant ones.104  If Congress included extensive documentation indicating that 
a “substantial effect” existed, would that be sufficient?  Would it be enough if 
Congress had attached a “jurisdictional element”—if it had burdened the 
government to show that the defendant’s activities would substantially affect 
interstate commerce?  As shown below, the Court in United States v. Morrison 
 
 97. Id. at 562.  After the Lopez decision, the statute was amended to include a jurisdictional 
element.  See 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (Supp. IV 1998) (requiring a showing that the firearm 
“has moved in or . . .  otherwise affects interstate or foreign commerce”). 
 98. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562-63. 
 99. See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964); Katzenbach v. 
McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964). 
 100. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563-67. 
 101. See id. at 564.  Justice Breyer reiterated this argument in his dissent, claiming that gun 
violence in schools has an adverse effect on classroom learning, preventing students from 
receiving the skills required for future jobs, and that this in turn would substantially harm 
interstate commerce.  Id. at 622-23. 
 102. Id. at 567. 
 103. The Court stated that maintaining a “healthy balance of power between the States and 
the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front.”  Id. at 552 
(quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991)). 
 104. See Andrew St. Laurent, Reconstituting United States v. Lopez: Another Look at Federal 
Criminal Law, 31 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 61, 83 (1997) (stating that “[w]hich of these Lopez 
factors, if any, will emerge as the determinative ones [is] yet to be established”). 
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answered “no” to the former question; a challenge to the hate crime legislation 
would answer the latter. 
Also unclear was the viability of the Lopez decision itself.  The case was a 
5-4 decision, and three justices wrote particularly vigorous dissents.105  Justice 
Kennedy wrote a separate concurring opinion, joined by Justice O’Connor, 
stressing that Lopez should be regarded as a “limited holding.”106  Kennedy 
expressed reluctance to reverse decades of Commerce Clause case law and was 
comfortable with Lopez only because he found it did not overrule any previous 
Supreme Court decision.107  Therefore, it remained to be seen whether Lopez 
would represent a dramatic change in Commerce Clause jurisprudence or 
simply prove to be an anomaly.108 
B. The Fourteenth Amendment and the “State Action” Doctrine 
The Fourteenth Amendment historically has been a source of authority for 
federal laws protecting civil rights, although it is not relied upon in the Local 
Law Enforcement Enhancement Act.  Ratified in 1868, the Fourteenth 
Amendment was one of three constitutional amendments passed in the wake of 
the Civil War.  The main objective of these post-Civil War amendments was to 
ensure that former black slaves were recognized as free citizens and were 
endowed with all rights and privileges enjoyed by white citizens.109  The 
Fourteenth Amendment mandates, among other things, that no state “deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”110  Section 
 
 105. Justices Stevens, Souter and Breyer all wrote dissenting opinions.  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 
602-44.  Justices Ginsburg, Stevens and Souter joined with Breyer’s dissent.  Id. at 615. 
 106. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 568 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 107. Kennedy recognized that “the Court as an institution and the legal system as a whole 
have an immense stake in the stability of our Commerce Clause jurisprudence as it has evolved to 
this point.”  Id. at 574.  With respect to the Gun-Free School Zones Act, however, Kennedy 
concluded that “we have not yet said the commerce power may reach so far.”  Id. at 580.  Justice 
Thomas also wrote a concurring opinion in Lopez, although he advocated extending the 
majority’s holding rather than limiting it.  Id. at 584-602.  Thomas called for eliminating the 
“substantial effects” test altogether, finding it inconsistent with both the text of the Constitution 
and with earlier case law.  Id. at 601. 
 108. See, e.g., Parker Douglas, The Violence Against Women Act and Contemporary 
Commerce Power: Principled Regulation and the Concerns of Federalism, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 
703, 706 (recognizing that scholars regarded Lopez as “either a contraction of Congress’s 
previously expansive regulatory power under the Commerce Clause or a limited ruling that will 
have little or no impact on future commerce power debates”).  See also United States v. Bishop, 
66 F.3d 569, 590 (3d Cir. 1995) (arguing that after Lopez, “the winds have not shifted that 
much.”); James M. McGoldrick, The Civil Rights Cases: The Relevancy of Reversing a Hundred 
Plus Year Old Error, 42 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 451, 474 (1998) (predicting that “it is doubtful that 
Lopez will lead to any significant restriction on commerce power”). 
 109. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306 (1880). 
 110. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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5 of the Amendment gives Congress the power “to enforce, by appropriate 
legislation, the provisions of [the Amendment].”111 
The right to “equal protection,” however, has never been absolute.  The 
Supreme Court has allowed states limited room to treat classes of citizens 
differently.112  Under early equal protection jurisprudence, the Supreme Court 
allowed differences in treatment if the differentiation was reasonable and fairly 
related to the object of the regulation.113  The Court revamped this approach in 
the 1960s under the guidance of Chief Justice Warren.  While retaining the old 
“reasonableness” standard for some types of discrimination, the Warren Court 
imposed a “strict scrutiny” test on other forms of differentiation.114  Under this 
test, a state’s discriminatory practices could only be constitutional if they were 
“necessary” to achieve a legislative end (as opposed to being “fairly related” to 
the end)115 and the legislation served a “compelling” state interest.116 
This dual system of analysis was a target of hot debate.117  Courts 
struggled to determine which types of discrimination needed only pass the 
“reasonableness” (or “rational relation”) test and which were subject to the 
“strict scrutiny” test.  The Supreme Court ruled that regulations must pass the 
“strict scrutiny” test if they impact fundamental rights or if they involve 
“suspect” classifications.118  However, the terms “fundamental rights” and 
“suspect classifications” were left open for interpretation.119 
The Supreme Court has consistently found race to be a “suspect 
classification.”120  Discrimination based on national origin is also considered 
“suspect” and must pass the “strict scrutiny” test.121  The Court has also 
 
 111. Id. § 5. 
 112. See Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1995). 
 113. Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
 114. See GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 47, at 630. 
 115. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964). 
 116. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627, 634, 638 (1969). 
 117. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211-12 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing 
that the Equal Protection Clause “does not direct the courts to apply one standard of review in 
some cases and a different standard in other cases”). 
 118. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 375 (1971). 
 119. The struggle over “fundamental rights” has been the focus of countless treatises and 
articles, and it has sparked several controversial Supreme Court decisions.  See, e.g., San Antonio 
Independent Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (holding that public education is not a 
fundamental right under the Constitution); Graham, 403 U.S. at 375 (finding that the right to 
welfare benefits is fundamental).  However, since the hate crime bill, unlike existing federal anti-
bias laws, is not limited to activities that affect federally protected rights, the equal protection 
discussion here will focus only on the “suspect classification” aspect of the Supreme Court’s test. 
 120. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); Korematsu v. United States, 323 
U.S. 214, 216 (1944). 
 121. See Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 504 and n.10 (1976) (citing cases). 
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included religious discrimination in this category.122  The Court, however, has 
refused to include characteristics such as age, mental disability or sexual 
orientation under the “suspect” category.123  Thus, state laws that discriminate 
based on these latter classifications need only pass the “rational relation” 
test.124  Gender originally was classified as non-suspect.125  More recent 
Supreme Court decisions, however, have altered this.  Although the Court has 
never given gender classifications full “suspect” status, it has recognized them 
as “quasi-suspect,” requiring a third intermediate level of scrutiny.126 
The multi-tiered classification system has given courts some guidance 
when determining whether a state or local law violates the Equal Protection 
Clause.  A challenging party must show that the law fails to comport to the 
level of scrutiny appropriate for the particular type of discrimination at issue.  
However, in situations where Congress has acted affirmatively under Section 5 
of the Amendment to prevent discrimination, there is an additional hurdle that 
has to be crossed: the federal law or regulation must involve a state or state 
actor.127 
The Supreme Court clarified this “state action” requirement in the Civil 
Rights Cases of 1883.128  The cases were a consolidation of five challenges to 
the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which prohibited particular businesses from 
 
 122. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 885 (1985) (referring to religious 
discrimination as “inherently suspect”). 
 123. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83 (2000) (explicitly refusing to 
recognize age as a suspect class); Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 442 
(1985) (holding that a lower court erred in finding mental retardation to be a “quasi-suspect” 
classification, which would have triggered higher scrutiny); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631-
32 (1996) (implicitly classifying sexual orientation as non-suspect by analyzing discriminatory 
amendment to Colorado’s constitution using the lower “rational relation” test). 
 124. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 470 U.S. at 885 (holding that “[u]nless a classification 
trammels fundamental personal rights or is drawn upon inherently suspect distinctions . . . our 
decisions presume the constitutionality of the statutory discriminations and require only that the 
classification challenged be rationally related to a legitimate state interest”). 
 125. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (applying the “rational relation” standard 
to gender discrimination). 
 126. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (concluding that gender discrimination 
must serve “important” government objectives and must be “substantially related” to those 
objectives).  Scholars have suggested that the Court in Cleburne established a fourth level of 
scrutiny for disability discrimination, one that was stricter than the “rational relation” test but not 
as stringent as the intermediate standard of Craig.  See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 632 (1997).  However, in Heller v. Doe, 509 
U.S. 312, 318-19 (1993), the Supreme Court made it clear it was applying the lower “rational 
relation” standard when analyzing a law that discriminated between the mentally retarded and the 
mentally ill. 
 127. The plain language of the Amendment only prohibits states from practicing 
discrimination; it says nothing about private actors.  See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 128. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).  The Court stated: “Individual invasion of individual rights is not the 
subject-matter of the amendment.”  Id. at 11. 
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denying services to customers based on race, color or previous condition of 
servitude.129  The Court struck down as unconstitutional the provisions of the 
Act that were not directed at state actors.130  Over the years, however, the 
Court softened the “state action” requirement.  It ruled that Congress’s Section 
5 power could reach private actors who performed public functions.131  The 
Court also held that Congress could reach activities where the involvement of 
the state was merely peripheral.132 
The “state action” requirement continued to lose favor in the Warren 
Court.  In the 1966 case of United States v. Guest, 133 six justices advocated an 
outright abandonment of the “state action” interpretation laid out in the Civil 
Rights Cases.  Justice Brennan, in an opinion joined by Chief Justice Warren 
and Justice Douglas, wrote that he did not accept an interpretation of Section 5 
that limited Congress’s power to the correction of ills caused by state laws or 
state actions.134  Justice Clark, joined by Justices Black and Fortas, wrote: 
“[T]here now can be no doubt that the specific language of [Section] 5 
empowers the Congress to enact laws punishing all conspiracies—with or 
without state action—that interfere with Fourteenth Amendment rights.”135  
These arguments, however, were made in dicta.136  Thus, scholars were unsure 
how later courts would read Guest.137  At the time of United States v. 
Morrison, the status of the state action requirement was still unclear. 
C. The Thirteenth Amendment 
The Thirteenth Amendment bans slavery and involuntary servitude.138  
Like the Fourteenth Amendment, it was passed in the wake of the Civil War in 
an attempt to promote equality between black and white citizens.  It is also 
similar to the Fourteenth Amendment in that it empowers Congress to enforce 
 
 129. Id. at 8-9. 
 130. Id. at 18-19. 
 131. See, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 508 (1946) (holding that exclusion of 
Jehovah’s witnesses from company-owned town constituted a state action because town 
functioned like a public municipality). 
 132. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1944) (holding that judicial 
enforcement of a private covenant that excluded minorities from property constituted a state 
action); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 755-56 (1966) (filing police report that falsely 
accused blacks of committing crimes was sufficient to satisfy the state action requirement). 
 133. 383 U.S. 745 (1966). 
 134. Id. at 782-83. 
 135. Id. at 762. 
 136. The majority concluded that the Court’s decision “require[d] no determination of the 
threshold level that state action must attain in order to create rights under the Equal Protection 
Clause.”  Id. at 756. 
 137. See Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court 1976 Term Foreword: Equal Citizenship 
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 34-38 (1977). 
 138. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. 
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the Amendment’s provisions.139  The Supreme Court has interpreted this grant 
of power broadly, finding that Congress can not only affirmatively enforce the 
ban on slavery and involuntary servitude, but can also enact legislation to erase 
“all badges and incidents of slavery in the United States.”140 
The scope of the “badges and incidents” language, however, has never 
been clear.  In the 1874 case of United States v. Cruikshank, a federal district 
court ruled that the Thirteenth Amendment authorizes the federal government 
to prosecute those who violate the rights and privileges of black citizens.141  
The court distinguished between ordinary crimes and crimes motivated by 
race.142  While the court found that ordinary crimes fall within the state’s 
exclusive jurisdiction, it stated that crimes motivated by race fall within federal 
authority under the Thirteenth Amendment.143  However, the Supreme Court, 
when reviewing the case, declined to comment on the lower court’s Thirteenth 
Amendment analysis.144  Later, in the Civil Rights Cases, the Court held that 
the “badges and incidents” of slavery do not include private acts of racial 
discrimination.145 
This interpretation was abandoned, however, in the 1968 case of Jones v. 
Alfred H. Mayer Co., where the Court concluded the Thirteenth Amendment 
does empower Congress to fight private racism.146  The Court held that a 
provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 allowing victims of racial 
discrimination to sue private defendants147 was a valid exercise of Congress’s 
Thirteenth Amendment authority.148  The Court pointed out that unlike the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the Thirteenth Amendment has no “state action” 
requirement.149  The Thirteenth Amendment, therefore, can reach a whole class 
of activities that are beyond the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment.  For 
example, the Court has found that Congress has power under the Thirteenth 
Amendment to eliminate racial barriers in the acquisition of property,150 access 
to amusement parks151 and admission to private schools.152 
 
 139. Id. § 2. 
 140. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 20. 
 141. United States v. Cruikshank, 25 F. Cas. 707, 711-12 (C.C.D. La. 1874). 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 712. 
 144. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875). 
 145. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 24-25. 
 146. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 413 (1968). 
 147. The statute provides that “[a]ll citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in 
every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, 
hold, and convey real and personal property.”  42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1994). 
 148. Jones, 392 U.S. at 413. 
 149. Id. at 438.  The plain text of the Amendment simply declares that “[n]either slavery nor 
involuntary servitude . . . shall exist within the United States.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. 
 150. See Jones, 392 U.S. at 409 (1968). 
 151. See Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229 (1969). 
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Although the Thirteenth Amendment was originally directed toward 
blacks, the Court has stated that Congress can exercise its power under the 
Amendment to eliminate other forms of racial discrimination.153  The Court 
also implied that the Thirteenth Amendment reaches discrimination based on 
ethnicity and religion.154  Scholars have even suggested that the Thirteenth 
Amendment can reach gender discrimination as well,155 but the Supreme Court 
has never addressed this issue. 
There has been a striking paucity of cases concerning Thirteenth 
Amendment doctrine.  The Amendment last attracted Supreme Court scrutiny 
in 1989.156  Aside from the cases cited above, Thirteenth Amendment 
jurisprudence has remained virtually dormant since the nineteenth century.157  
This is not surprising given the Court’s broad interpretation of the Commerce 
Clause.  As shown in the Heart of Atlanta and McClung cases discussed above, 
federal bias laws have been easily justified under the Court’s broad 
interpretation of the Commerce Clause.158  There had rarely been a need, then, 
for litigants to advance a Thirteenth Amendment argument.  However, in light 
of the Lopez decision and its narrowing of Congress’s Commerce Clause 
authority, the Thirteenth Amendment may prove to be a crucial “back-up” 
argument to justify congressional actions that may no longer fit into the 
Court’s new view of Commerce Clause power. 
D. Summary 
Before the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Morrison, the 
scope of federal authority under the Commerce Clause, the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the Thirteenth Amendment was anything but clear.  It was 
apparent that Lopez significantly limited Congress’s broad power under the 
Commerce Clause, but the extent to which this power was limited remained 
unclear.  The Fourteenth Amendment’s “state action” requirement seemed to 
survive, but significant doubt still existed about its vitality.  Congress’s 
 
 152. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976). 
 153. See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Trans. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 287-88 (1976) (finding that 
allowing whites to bring suit under the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was consistent with Congress’s 
enforcement power under the Thirteenth Amendment). 
 154. See Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615 (1987).  The Court concluded that 
discrimination against Jews and Arabs was covered by § 1982, the same statute the Court had 
found in Jones to be a valid exercise of Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment power.  Id. at 617-18.  
The Court, however, did not explicitly address the Thirteenth Amendment issue. 
 155. See, e.g., Emily Calhoun, The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments: Constitutional 
Authority for Federal Legislation Against Private Sex Discrimination, 61 MINN. L. REV. 313, 
349-62 (1977). 
 156. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989). 
 157. See generally Douglas L. Colbert, Liberating the Thirteenth Amendment, 30 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1995). 
 158. See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text. 
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Thirteenth Amendment authority was, and still remains, relatively unlitigated.  
Although the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Morrison did not 
touch on the Thirteenth Amendment, it did make strides in clarifying both the 
Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment’s “state action” 
requirement. 
III.  UNITED STATES V. MORRISON 
A. Violence Against Women Act 
At issue in the Morrison case was the civil remedy provision of the 
Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA).159  The VAWA was first 
introduced in both the Senate and House of Representatives in 1991.160  The 
bill was subjected to almost four years of hearings in the Senate Judiciary 
Committee and in various House committees as well.161  These hearings 
resulted in what one court described as “voluminous” findings and a 
“mountain” of legislative history.162  Through this evidence, Congress 
attempted to demonstrate that violence against women had become a national 
epidemic with devastating effects.  For example, one Senate report found that 
domestic violence alone costs the nation as a whole between $5 billion and $10 
billion a year on health care, criminal justice and other social costs.163  The 
report also found that more than four million women are battered by their 
husbands or partners each year and that three of every four American women 
are victims of violent crimes at some point in their lives.164  The report also 
included data suggesting that states had been lax in dealing with the problem of 
violence against women.165 
The congressional hearings also produced evidence that domestic violence 
had a serious detrimental effect on interstate commerce.  A Senate report 
concluded that “[g]ender-based crimes and fear of gender-based crimes 
restricts movement, reduces employment opportunities, increases health 
expenditures, and reduces consumer spending, all of which affect interstate 
commerce and the national economy.”166 
 
 159. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994). 
 160. See S. 15, 102d Cong. (1991); H.R. 1502, 102d Cong. (1991). 
 161. See Dombrowsky, supra note 53, at 600-01. 
 162. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 132 F.3d 949, 964, 968 (4th 
Cir. 1997).  Justice Souter also adopted the “mountain” metaphor in his dissenting opinion in 
Morrison.  United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 628-29 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 163. S. REP. NO. 103-138, at 41 (1993). 
 164. Id. at 38. 
 165. Id. at 44-47. 
 166. Id. at 54. 
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The VAWA was finally enacted on September 13, 1994, as part of the 
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.167  The VAWA did 
several things to combat the perceived epidemic of violence against women.  It 
provided grants to states to help police officers and prosecutors fight these 
types of crimes.168  It also established a grant to create a national toll-free 
domestic abuse hotline.169  More significantly, however, the Act provided for 
criminal and civil penalties against perpetrators of gender-motivated violence.  
The law made it a federal offense to cross state lines (or enter or leave Indian 
territory) for the purpose of committing a crime of violence against women.170  
The most controversial provision of the Act, however, was the civil remedy 
provision. 
The civil remedy provision, codified in § 13981 of Title 42, United States 
Code, provided that “[a] person . . . who commits a crime of violence 
motivated by gender . . . shall be liable to the party injured, in an action for the 
recovery of compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive and declaratory 
relief, and such other relief as a court may deem appropriate.”171  The statute 
defined a “crime of violence” as an act that could constitute a felony against 
the victim whether or not criminal charges have been filed.172  The statute 
stated that a crime was “motivated by gender” if it was committed “because of 
gender or on the basis of gender, and due, at least in part, to an animus based 
on the victim’s gender.”173 
According to the text of the statute, § 13981 drew its authority from both 
the Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.174  Unlike 
the criminal provision, however, § 13981 did not require that the perpetrator or 
victim travel across state lines or engage in any interstate or commercial 
activity.  Furthermore, the statute did not provide a cause of action against a 
 
 167. Pub. L. No. 103-322 §§ 40001-40703, 108 Stat. 1796, 1902-55 (1994).  The O.J. 
Simpson case, which brought the issue of domestic violence to the national forefront, may have 
been partially responsible for the VAWA’s passage.  See, e.g., Linda Hirshman, Scholars in the 
Service of Politics; Those Who Would Deny Men’s Abuse of Women Twist Statistics and Skip the 
Research, L.A. TIMES, July 31, 1994, at M5; Stacey L. McKinley, Note, The Violence Against 
Women Act After United States v. Lopez: Will Domestic Violence Jurisdiction Be Returned to the 
States?, 44 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 345, 345-46 (1996). 
 168. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3796gg-3796gg-5 (1994). 
 169. Id. § 10416. 
 170. 18 U.S.C. § 2261 (1994). 
 171. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c) (1994). 
 172. Id. § 13981(d)(2). 
 173. Id. § 13981(d)(1). 
 174. Id. § 13981(a).  Some scholars suggested that the civil remedy provision could be 
justified under the Thirteenth Amendment as well.  See Violence Against Women: Victims of the 
System: Hearing on S. 15 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 101-102 (1991) 
(statement of Burt Neuborne, Professor, New York University School of Law).  However, the 
Thirteenth Amendment was not used as a basis of authority in the statute’s findings. 
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state or state actor, nor did it require state action before the remedy could be 
utilized. 
Women’s groups immediately recognized the civil remedy provision of the 
VAWA as a powerful new weapon in the war against gender-motivated 
violence.175  But the Lopez decision, which came out seven months after the 
VAWA was passed, cast doubt upon § 13981’s constitutionality.176  Thus, it 
seemed likely that invoking the VAWA’s civil remedy provision would lead to 
a constitutional challenge in the Supreme Court.  Ultimately, that is what 
happened, and a young woman named Christy Brzonkala would act as the test 
subject. 
B. Facts of the Case 
Brzonkala’s story began on September 21, 1994, one week after the 
VAWA became law, while Brzonkala was a freshman at Virginia Polytechnic 
Institute (Virginia Tech).177  According to Brzonkala, she was raped in her 
dorm room that night by two varsity football players, Antonio Morrison and 
James Crawford.178  She claimed that Morrison requested sexual intercourse 
from her, but after she adamantly refused, he pinned her against her bed, 
ripped her clothes off and forced her to submit to vaginal intercourse.179  
Brzonkala claimed that when Morrison was finished, Crawford switched 
places with him and proceeded to rape her as well.180  Brzonkala said that after 
that, Morrison raped her a second time and left her with a warning: “You better 
not have any fucking diseases.”181  Later, Morrison was heard in the dormitory 
dining room declaring that he “like[d] to get girls drunk and fuck the shit out of 
them.” 182 
Brzonkala slipped into a deep depression after that.183  She stopped 
attending classes and even attempted suicide.184  Eventually, she sought a 
temporary withdrawal from the university for the 1994-95 academic year.185  
In April 1995, Brzonkala filed a complaint with the university against the two 
athletes.186  At a disciplinary hearing, Morrison admitted having nonconsensual 
 
 175. See, e.g., Deborah Ellis, Crime Bill Should Make Women Feel Safer, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
20, 1994, at A22. 
 176. See generally McKinley, supra note 167. 
 177. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 132 F.3d 949, 953 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Brzonkala, 132 F.3d at 953. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id.  She did not press criminal charges due to a loss of physical evidence over the 
previous seven months.  Id. at 954. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
994 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 45:973 
intercourse with Brzonkala.187  Crawford, however, denied having sex with 
her.188  After hearing all the evidence, the university suspended Morrison for 
two semesters but found insufficient evidence to punish Crawford.189 
Morrison hired an attorney, who claimed that Morrison’s due process 
rights were violated at the hearing and threatened to sue the university.190  The 
university backed down and agreed to grant Morrison a new hearing,191 where 
Brzonkala again recounted the events of September 24, 1994.192  After seven 
hours, the committee re-imposed Morrison’s two-semester suspension.193 
Unfortunately for Brzonkala, this was not the end of the story.  The young 
woman, struggling to put the whole tragedy behind her, was devastated to read 
in a newspaper that the university’s senior vice president and provost had 
overturned Morrison’s suspension and instead found him guilty of the lesser 
offense of “using abusive language.”194  The school had not bothered to tell 
Brzonkala that the man who had admitted to sexually assaulting her would 
again be attending classes with her.195  Brzonkala, fearing for her life, dropped 
out of Virginia Tech.196 
C. Lower Courts’ Rulings 
Brzonkala brought a federal suit against the university and several of its 
top officials under Title IX of the Education Amendment Act,197 claiming she 
was treated unfairly because of her gender and was subjected to a hostile 
environment.198  She also sued Morrison and Crawford in federal court under 
§ 13981 of the VAWA.199 
Both of her claims were dismissed at the district court level.  The court 
granted the defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion on the Title IX claim.200  On the 
 
 187. Brzonkala, 132 F.3d at 954. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id.  Morrison’s due process claim was based on an “ex post facto” allegation: he claimed 
he was disciplined under a sexual assault policy that had not yet been published in the student 
handbook.  Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Brzonkala, 132 F.3d at 954-55. 
 193. Id. at 955. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. at 956. 
 196. Id. at 955. 
 197. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1994). 
 198. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 772 (W.D. Va. 
1996) [hereinafter Brzonkala I]. 
 199. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779 (W.D. Va. 
1996) [hereinafter Brzonkala II]. 
 200. Brzonkala I, 935 F. Supp. at 779.  On the “disparate treatment” claim, the court ruled 
that Brzonkala failed to allege facts supporting an inference of discriminatory intent on the part of 
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VAWA complaint, the court conceded that Brzonkala had made a valid claim 
under the statute,201 but found that § 13981 was not constitutional under either 
the Commerce Clause or Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.202 
The court’s Commerce Clause analysis centered on a comparison between 
§ 13981 and the Gun-Free School Zones Act, the statute struck down in Lopez.  
The court recognized three differences between the two laws: (1) § 13981 is 
civil and the Gun-Free School Zones Act is criminal; (2) § 13981 is backed by 
legislative findings; and (3) § 13981 requires fewer steps of causation between 
the regulated activity and commerce.203  Nonetheless, the court concluded that 
these differences were “insignificant” and were overshadowed by the striking 
similarities between the two laws.204  Therefore, the court held that Congress 
exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause when it passed § 13981, as 
it had when it passed the Gun-Free School Zones Act.205  The court also 
engaged in a lengthy discussion of Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, 
ultimately concluding that “some state involvement is necessary” for Congress 
to invoke this power and that the “VAWA does not address the states.”206  
Based on that discussion, the court concluded that enacting § 13981 was not a 
legitimate exercise of federal authority under the Fourteenth Amendment.207  
The court sympathized with Brzonkala’s plight, but stressed “Congress is not 
invested with the authority to cure all of the ills of mankind.”208 
The Fourth Circuit reversed the lower court’s decision and reinstated 
Brzonkala’s § 13981 claim and her Title IX claim.209  The three-judge panel 
concluded that § 13981 was a valid exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause 
authority.210  Unlike the district court, the panel found the “mountain” of 
legislative findings supporting § 13981 to be a significant factor in 
 
the defendants.  Id. at 778.  As to the “hostile environment” claim, the court found that the alleged 
actions of the university did not amount to an objective hostile environment, nor did Brzonkala 
allege that she perceived the environment to be hostile; rather, she feared future hostility.  Id. 
 201. Brzonkala’s pleadings met the minimum requirements under the statute because the 
characteristic of the alleged rape combined with Morrison’s disparaging comments constituted a 
claim of “gender animus.”  Brzonkala II, 935 F. Supp. at 785. 
 202. Id. at 801. 
 203. Id. at 789. 
 204. In particular, the court found these similarities: both regulated local criminal activity, 
both lacked a jurisdictional element and both inappropriately tipped the balance of power away 
from the states.  Id. at 791-92. 
 205. Brzonkala II, 935 F. Supp. at 793. 
 206. Id. at 794, 800. 
 207. Id. at 801. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir. 1997) 
[hereinafter Brzonkala III].  The Fourth Circuit disagreed with the district court with respect to 
Brzonkala’s “hostile environment” claim but affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of her 
“disparate treatment” claim.  Id. at 961, 962. 
 210. Id. at 974. 
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distinguishing the case from Lopez.211  Pointing out that Lopez was a “limited 
holding,”212 the panel affirmed § 13981’s constitutionality and remanded the 
case.213  Because the court found § 13981 constitutional under the Commerce 
Clause, it did not address whether the section was valid under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.214 
The Fourth Circuit vacated this decision six weeks later after rehearing the 
case en banc.215  The full Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision 
with respect to both the Title IX216 and § 13981 claims.217  Circuit Judge 
Luttig,218 in a rather colorful opinion, seemed to mock the petitioners for trying 
to use “interstate commerce” power to regulate a “non-commercial intrastate” 
activity.219  He found § 13981 to be beyond the scope of Congress’s 
Commerce Clause power.220  Finding otherwise, he argued, would violate 
fundamental principles of federalism.221  Furthermore, Luttig refused to ignore 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s “state action” requirement.222  Thus, the court 
upheld the district court’s ruling and dismissed the case.223  The Supreme 
Court granted certiorari to decide whether § 13981 was constitutional,224 but it 
denied certiorari as to Brzonkala’s Title IX claim.225 
D. Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause Analysis 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, the author of Lopez, wrote for the majority in 
Morrison.  Addressing the Commerce Clause issue first, Rehnquist applied the 
 
 211. Id. at 968. 
 212. Id. at 969 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 568 (1995) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring)). 
 213. Id. at 974. 
 214. Brzonkala III, 132 F.3d at 964 n.8. 
 215. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999) 
[hereinafter Brzonkala IV]. 
 216. Id. at 827 n.2. 
 217. Id. at 889. 
 218. Luttig dissented in the previous Fourth Circuit decision.  Brzonkala III, 132 F.3d at 974-
78. 
 219. Brzonkala IV, 169 F.3d at 826. 
 220. Luttig wrote: “Because section 13981 neither regulates an economic activity nor includes 
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 221. See id. at 840-43. 
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 223. Id. at 889. 
 224. United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 11 (1999). 
 225. United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1578 (2000). 
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three-prong test he had established five years earlier in Lopez.226  He first 
established, and petitioners had conceded, that § 13981 did not fall under either 
of the first two categories: it did not seek to regulate a channel of interstate 
commerce, nor did it seek to regulate an instrumentality of interstate 
commerce.227  Like the Gun-Free School Zones Act, § 13981 could only be 
constitutional under the Commerce Clause if it passed the “substantial effects” 
test as defined in Lopez.228  The Court used the four Lopez factors to determine 
whether the action sought to be regulated, gender-motivated violence, was one 
that had a substantial effect on interstate commerce.  Unlike Lopez, however, 
the Morrison Court gave some indications as to which of the four factors were 
more important to the analysis. 
1. The nature of the conduct regulated 
The Court made it clear that this factor should be given the greatest weight.  
The majority chastised the petitioners and Justice Souter’s dissent for failing to 
recognize that the non-economic, criminal nature of the conduct at issue in 
Lopez was “central” to the decision in that case.229  As he did in Lopez, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist pointed out that every time the Court upheld a statute under 
the “substantial effects” test, “the activity in question had been some sort of 
economic endeavor.”230  Even though § 13981 was a civil rather than a 
criminal statute, the majority had no trouble finding that gender-motivated 
violence was not economic in nature.231 
2. Jurisdictional element 
The Court was less clear on the importance of the jurisdictional element.  
Depending on how one reads a statement in the opinion, this factor is either 
critical or is barely significant.  The Court stated that “a jurisdictional element 
may establish that the enactment [§ 13981] is in pursuance of Congress’ 
regulation of interstate commerce.”232  This seems to hint that had § 13981 
contained a jurisdictional element, it would have been constitutional despite its 
non-economic nature.  On the other hand, this phrase can be interpreted as an 
implied warning that since a jurisdictional element “may” establish 
constitutionality, it also may not, and thus a jurisdictional element, standing 
alone, would not be sufficient to show constitutionality.  In addition, the 
majority stated that a jurisdictional element would merely “lend support” to the 
 
 226. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608-09 (2000). 
 227. Id. at 609. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. at 610. 
 230. Id. at 611 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559-600 (1995)). 
 231. Rehnquist wrote: “Gender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the 
phrase, economic activity.”  Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613. 
 232. Id. at 612 
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argument that the statute has a sufficient link to interstate commerce.233  Like 
the Gun-Free School Zones Act, § 13981 also lacked a jurisdictional 
element.234 
3. Congressional findings 
The key distinction between the Gun-Free School Zones Act and § 13981 
was the congressional findings listed in the latter along with the “mountain” of 
findings that came out of almost four years’ worth of committee reports.  The 
majority conceded that the findings supporting the VAWA’s constitutionality 
were “numerous.”235  However, the Court made it clear that “the existence of 
congressional findings is not sufficient, by itself, to sustain the constitutionality 
of Commerce Clause legislation.”236  The Court restated that whether an 
activity has a substantial effect on interstate commerce is a “judicial rather than 
a legislative question” and that the Supreme Court has the final say on the 
matter.237  The Court abandoned the “rational basis” test used in Heart of 
Atlanta and McClung, which limited the Court’s review of a congressional 
finding of substantial effects.238  Instead, the Court made it clear that 
congressional findings need to be more than just rational; they need to 
convince the Court that a substantial effect indeed exists. 
4. Attenuation of the link to interstate commerce 
The Court used a two-pronged analysis to determine whether the link 
between gender-motivated violence and interstate commerce was attenuated.  
First, the Court pointed out that the causal connection relied upon in the 
congressional findings was based on the same “cost of crime” and “national 
productivity” chain of inferences that the Court had found insufficient in 
Lopez.239  In rejecting this approach once again, the Court made it clear that it 
would not apply the aggregation principle of Wickard to regulations of non-
economic violent crimes.240 
Second, the Court found the link to be attenuated because it, when taken to 
its logical extremes, put no limit on Congress’s power under the Commerce 
 
 233. Id. at 613. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. at 614. 
 236. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614. 
 237. Id. 
 238. The phrase “rational basis” appears nowhere in the majority opinion.  See id. at 601-27.  
Contrast this with Lopez, where the Court at least acknowledged the precedents supporting the 
“rational basis” test.  See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995). 
 239. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615. 
 240. The Court stated: “We accordingly reject the argument that Congress may regulate 
noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct’s aggregate effect on 
interstate commerce.”  Id. at 617. 
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Clause.241  Thus, it would allow Congress to inappropriately intrude upon 
matters that are traditionally left to the states.  Stressing that “the limitation of 
congressional authority is not solely a matter of legislative grace,” the Court 
emphasized that a line must be drawn between what is of national concern and 
what is of local concern.242  The Court found that regulation and punishment of 
intrastate violence has always been a matter for the states.243  As if that were 
not enough, the Court further stated that “we can think of no better example of 
the police power, which the Founders denied the National Government and 
reposed in the States, than the suppression of violent crime and vindication of 
its victims.”244 
Neither Justice Kennedy nor Justice O’Connor chose to write separately in 
Morrison.  Rather, they joined Rehnquist’s opinion, sending a clear message 
that the Lopez-Morrison test is now the proper one to use when analyzing 
federal laws passed under the Commerce Clause.  Thus, contrary to some 
predictions, the Supreme Court used its first post-Lopez Commerce Clause 
case to strengthen Lopez rather than to distinguish it as a limited holding.245  
Justice Thomas wrote a brief concurring opinion in Morrison, in which he 
reprised an argument he made in Lopez, calling for the elimination of the 
“substantial effects” test.246 
E. Supreme Court’s Fourteenth Amendment Analysis 
The Court’s analysis of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment was 
strikingly clear.  The Court unambiguously held that it would follow the 
principle set out in the Civil Rights Cases that the Fourteenth Amendment 
prohibits only state action.  Rehnquist called this a “time-honored principle” 
that is “‘firmly embedded in our constitutional law.’”247  The Court stressed 
that the Amendment “‘erects no shield against merely private conduct.’”248 
The petitioners tried to argue that this principle had been abandoned in 
Guest, where six justices agreed that Congress should be given more power to 
punish private actors under Section 5.  However, Rehnquist stated that this 
“naked dicta” could not supplant the “enduring vitality” of the state action 
requirement.249  The Court easily found, as had the en banc Fourth Circuit and 
 
 241. Id. at 615-16. 
 242. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 616-18. 
 243. Id. at 618. 
 244. Id. 
 245. See supra note 108. 
 246. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627. 
 247. Id. at 621 (quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 and n.12 (1948)). 
 248. Id. (quoting Kraemer, 334 U.S. at 13 and n.12). 
 249. Id. at 624. 
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the district court, that § 13981 was not directed at a state or state actor and thus 
could not be constitutional under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.250 
F. Dissenting opinions 
Justices Souter and Breyer dissented in Morrison.  Souter, who wrote the 
longer of the two opinions, attacked the majority’s Commerce Clause analysis 
on several grounds.  First, he took issue with the majority’s conclusion that the 
“substantial effects” question is one for the courts to answer.251  According to 
Justice Souter, the majority departed from the decisions of Heart of Atlanta 
and McClung, which stressed that the judiciary’s role is not to second-guess 
whether a “substantial effect” on interstate commerce exists, but rather to 
determine whether Congress had a “rational basis” to find such an effect.252  
He pointed out that mere anecdotal evidence of a substantial effect was 
sufficient to satisfy the “rational basis” test in Heart of Atlanta and 
McClung.253  Yet, in Morrison, the majority determined that Congress’s 
“mountain” of statistical, scientific evidence was not sufficient.254 Justice 
Souter found these conclusions irreconcilable.255 
Justice Souter also disagreed with the Court’s emphasis on the “nature of 
the activity regulated” factor.  He argued that case law made it clear that the 
nature of an activity that causes a burden on interstate commerce is irrelevant 
in determining whether the activity can be regulated under the Commerce 
Clause.256  To Justice Souter, the majority erred by making the “substantial 
effects” test dependent upon the nature of the cause.257  He also disagreed with 
the majority over the importance of a statute’s infringement into traditionally 
state matters.  He argued that the majority’s belief that the Constitution divides 
power into easily definable “state” and “federal” spheres is mistaken.258  
Federalism, he argued, is better protected by procedural safeguards than by 
judicially created limits on federal power.259 
Like Justice Souter, Justice Breyer also criticized the majority for focusing 
on causes rather than on effects.260  He further chastised the majority for 
 
 250. Id. at 626-27. 
 251. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 628 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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 253. Id. at 635. 
 254. Id. at 614. 
 255. Id. at 634-35 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 256. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 640-45 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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creating an amorphous “economic or non-economic” test that he believed 
would lead to confusion and inconsistencies among lower courts.261  Also, 
Justice Breyer argued that it is inappropriate for the Court to continue to limit 
federal authority during a time when the country is becoming increasingly 
nationalized.262  Unlike Justice Souter, however, Justice Breyer also expressed 
unease about the majority’s Fourteenth Amendment analysis.  Although he 
refrained from attacking the majority’s conclusion head-on, he did state that he 
had “serious doubts” about the validity of the “state action” requirement.263  He 
questioned why Section 5 would not allow Congress to provide a remedy 
against a private actor.264 
IV.  MORRISON’S IMPACT ON LATER COMMERCE CLAUSE CASES 
Justice Breyer’s dissent notwithstanding, the Morrison opinion has 
definitely cleared the air with respect to Section 5 and the “state action” 
doctrine.  Reading the opinion, one might predict that the decision would also 
spark a dramatic change in lower courts’ interpretations of the Commerce 
Clause.  This, however, has not been the case.  As shown below, most lower 
courts hearing Commerce Clause challenges to federal laws have construed 
Morrison in its narrowest sense.  Thus, the overwhelming trend is to 
distinguish Morrison rather than to apply it to other federal laws. 
One way courts have downplayed the impact of Morrison is by ignoring 
the fact that the Supreme Court failed to use the “rational basis” test in the case 
to determine whether a substantial effect on interstate commerce was present.  
Although the Court did not explicitly reject the “rational basis” test, its 
conclusion in the case implied that it did.  As Justice Souter pointed out in his 
dissent, the “mountain” of evidence supporting the VAWA was a much 
stronger indicator of a rational basis than was the anecdotal evidence used to 
support Title II in Heart of Atlanta and McClung.265  It is more reasonable to 
conclude, then, that the Court abandoned the “rational basis” test (or drastically 
changed it) rather than to conclude that the “mountain” of evidence did not 
meet the “rational basis” standard.  Despite this logic, however, many lower 
courts have concluded that the “rational basis” test survived Morrison.266 
 
 261. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 656-57 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 262. Id. at 660. 
 263. Id. at 664-66.  Justice Breyer stated: “I need not, and do not, answer the § 5 
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Courts have also misinterpreted the fourth factor of the Lopez-Morrison 
test, the “attenuation” factor.  Some courts have failed to acknowledge that the 
attenuation test must be used in light of the distinction between state and 
federal spheres of authority.267  For example, the Fifth Circuit, in Groome 
Resources Ltd. v. Parish of Jefferson,268 limited its “attenuation” analysis to a 
question of whether the causal chain relied on the prohibited “cost of crime” or 
“national productivity” arguments.269  The court did not address the broader 
question of whether the chain of reasoning would potentially allow the federal 
government to infringe upon matters traditionally left to the states.270  Other 
courts have construed this fourth factor in a similar fashion.271 
Perhaps the most significant uncertainty about the Commerce Clause after 
Morrison is the relative weight the courts should give to each of the four 
“substantial effects” factors.  For example, in United States v. Visnich,272 a 
federal district court in Ohio found that Morrison was merely a shift of 
emphasis away from the “congressional findings” factor.273  In upholding the 
constitutionality of a federal law prohibiting certain people under protective 
orders from possessing firearms,274 the Visnich court found the statute’s 
jurisdictional element to be sufficient in distinguishing it from the VAWA’s 
civil remedy provision.275  The court downplayed the importance of the “nature 
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(1935) (Cardozo, J., concurring)).  Furthermore, it is clear that the state/federal distinction was 
critical to the Court’s analysis in Morrison.  See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618 (stating that the 
activity regulated by § 13981 of the VAWA “has always been the province of the States”). 
 268. 234 F.3d 192 (5th Cir. 2000). 
 269. Id. at 214-15. 
 270. See generally id. 
 271. See, e.g., Allied Local & Reg’l Mfrs. Caucus v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, 215 F.3d 61, 
82 (D.C. Cir. 2000).  The court in that case concluded that the link between air pollution and 
interstate commerce was not attenuated, but it did not examine whether the scope of the federal 
regulation at issue would infringe on matters traditionally of state concern.  Id.  See also United 
States v. Feliciano, 223 F.3d 102, 119 (2d Cir. 2000) (ignoring the fourth factor altogether). 
 272. 109 F. Supp. 2d 757 (N.D. Ohio 2000). 
 273. Id. at 761.  The court concluded that Morrison was “neither a change nor a modification 
in Commerce Clause jurisprudence, but merely a change in emphasis on one of the several factors 
the Court considers in evaluating legislation based on Congress’s Commerce Clause powers.”  Id. 
 274. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). 
 275. Visnich, 109 F. Supp. 2d at 761-62.  Apparently, members of Congress also concluded 
that the lack of a jurisdictional element was the fatal flaw of § 13981.  In July 2000, the civil 
remedy provision was reintroduced in the House of Representatives with additional language 
requiring a link to interstate commerce.  H.R. 5021, 106th Cong. (2000). 
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of the activity” and the “attenuation” factors and declined to engage in any 
discussion of congressional findings.276 
The relative importance of the “jurisdictional element” factor is an 
especially controversial matter.  The favored approach among lower courts is 
the Visnich approach,277 to hold that a jurisdictional element alone can save a 
statute from the wrath of Morrison.278  One striking exception, however, can be 
found in United States v. Faasse.279  In that case, the Sixth Circuit struck down 
the Child Support Recovery Act, which makes it a federal crime to fail to pay 
child support for a child who lives in another state.280  Although the Faasse 
decision was later vacated by the Sixth Circuit,281 it nonetheless is significant 
because it was the first case after Morrison to find a statute unconstitutional in 
spite of a jurisdictional element.282  The court concluded that this jurisdictional 
“hook” was not enough to overcome its conclusion that child support 
obligations were not commercial in nature.283  Unlike the Visnich court, the 
Faasse court apparently read the Morrison decision to rely almost entirely on 
the “economic nature” factor and on the “attenuation” factor, with a special 
emphasis on the “infringement into state concerns” element.  The Faasse court 
stated that it was giving due regard to the Morrison Court’s warning against 
overly elastic conceptions of the Commerce Clause that give Congress 
authority over areas traditionally reserved for the states.284 
In the 2001 case of United States v. Sweet,285 a federal court in Oregon 
recognized that the lack of a jurisdictional element was not the sole reason that 
the Morrison Court struck down § 13981 of the VAWA.286  Like Visnich, the 
Sweet case also considered the constitutionality of a provision of the federal 
 
 276. See Visnich, 109 F. Supp. 2d at 761 n.5. 
 277. The choice of the Visnich case as an example is purely arbitrary, as is the label “Visnich 
approach.”  There is nothing particularly compelling about the Visnich case that would set it apart 
from the other cases that have adopted the same approach.  However, for the sake of expediency, 
the practice of using a statute’s jurisdictional element to uphold its constitutionality will 
hereinafter be referred to as the “Visnich approach.” 
 278. See, e.g., United States v. Napier, 233 F.3d 394, 402 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v. 
Wesela, 223 F.3d 656, 660 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Malone, 222 F.3d 1286, 1295 (10th 
Cir. 2000); United States v. Fleischli, 119 F. Supp. 2d 819, 822 (C.D. Ill. 2000); United States v. 
Suggs, No. 3:99CR244 (JBA), 2000 WL 1658591, at *6 (D. Conn. Sept. 7, 2000). 
 279. 227 F.3d 660 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 280. 18 U.S.C. § 228 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). 
 281. United States v. Faasse, 234 F.3d 312 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 282. The statute’s jurisdictional element is found at § 228(a). 
 283. Faasse, 227 F.3d at 670.  The court stated that holding otherwise would turn the 
“Interstate Commerce Clause” into the “Interstate Clause.”  Id. 
 284. Id. at 671-72 (citing United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615-16 (2000)). 
 285. No. CR 00-99-01-PA, 2000 WL 1845779 (D. Or. Sept. 7, 2000). 
 286. Id. at *5. 
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firearms statute.287  In the court’s decision, Judge Panner criticized earlier 
Ninth Circuit decisions that found the same statute constitutional merely 
because it contained a jurisdictional element.288  Panner suggested that the 
circuit court erred by failing to consider the other three Lopez-Morrison 
factors.289  He also hinted that the statute exceeded Congress’s Commerce 
Clause authority; yet he stated that he was bound to follow Ninth Circuit 
precedent, and he ruled the statute constitutional.290 
Although the Faasse decision did not stand, the Sweet decision indicates 
that the reasoning behind the Faasse opinion has support in other jurisdictions.  
Thus, it is still uncertain whether the Visnich approach or the Faasse approach 
will eventually prevail.  One thing that is certain about the Morrison decision 
is that it, like Lopez, has opened the floodgates for constitutional challenges to 
federal laws.291  Eager litigants have used Morrison to attack the 
constitutionality of everything from anti-racketeering laws292 to federal laws 
protecting abortion clinics.293  In light of this, there is little doubt that if a hate 
crime bill is passed into law, it will eventually meet the same fate.294 
V.  THE FEDERAL HATE CRIME BILL 
A. Provisions of the Legislation 
The Local Law Enforcement Enhancement Act of 2001 would add a new 
section 145 to title 18 of the United States Code.295  This new section would be 
divided into two parts.  Section (a)(1) would forbid “willfully caus[ing] bodily 
injury to any person or, through the use of fire, a firearm, or an explosive or 
incendiary device, attempt[ing] to cause bodily injury to any person, because 
of the actual or perceived race, color, religion, or national origin of any 
person.”296  Section (a)(2) would criminalize the same acts when based on 
 
 287. At issue in Sweet was the section banning convicted felons from carrying firearms.  See 
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (1994). 
 288. Sweet, 2000 WL 1845779, at *5. 
 289. Id. 
 290. Id. 
 291. The Lopez decision sparked a flood of cases attacking the constitutionality of federal 
statutes.  For a discussion of the proliferation of Commerce Clause challenges in the wake of 
Lopez, see Antony Barone Kolenc, Note, Commerce Clause Challenges After United States v. 
Lopez, 50 FLA. L. REV. 867 (1998). 
 292. See United States v. Feliciano, 223 F.3d 102, 119 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 293. See Norton v. Reno, No. 4:00-CV-141, 2000 WL 1769580 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 24, 2000). 
 294. See, e.g., Traditional Values Coalition, Hate Crimes Update: The Kennedy Amendment 
Details, available at http://www.traditionalvalues.org/hc_ken.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2001) 
(predicting that “the questionable constitutionality of Kennedy’s hate crime legislation . . . would 
undoubtedly be the subject of judicial challenge”). 
 295. S. 19, 107th Cong. § 107(a) (2001). 
 296. Section (a)(1) would read as follows: 
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religion, national origin, gender, sexual orientation or disability.297  While 
(a)(1) does not require the government to show any connection to interstate 
 
(1) OFFENSES INVOLVING ACTUAL OR PERCEIVED RACE, COLOR, RELIGION, 
OR NATIONAL ORIGIN- Whoever, whether or not acting under color of law, willfully 
causes bodily injury to any person or, through the use of fire, a firearm, or an explosive or 
incendiary device, attempts to cause bodily injury to any person, because of the actual or 
perceived race, color, religion, or national origin of any person— 
  (A) shall be imprisoned not more than 10 years, fined in accordance with this title, or 
both; and 
  (B) shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life, fined in accordance with this 
title, or both, if— 
(i) death results from the offense; or 
(ii) the offense includes kidnaping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual 
abuse or an attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill. 
Id. 
 297. Section (a)(2) would read as follows: 
(2) OFFENSES INVOLVING ACTUAL OR PERCEIVED RELIGION, NATIONAL 
ORIGIN, GENDER, SEXUAL ORIENTATION, OR DISABILITY- 
(A) IN GENERAL- Whoever, whether or not acting under color of law, in any 
circumstance described in subparagraph (B), willfully causes bodily injury to any person 
or, through the use of fire, a firearm, or an explosive or incendiary device, attempts to 
cause bodily injury to any person, because of the actual or perceived religion, national 
origin, gender, sexual orientation, or disability of any person— 
(i) shall be imprisoned not more than 10 years, fined in accordance with this title, 
or both; and 
(ii) shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life, fined in accordance with 
this title, or both, if— 
(I) death results from the offense; or 
(II) the offense includes kidnaping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual 
abuse or an attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill. 
(B) CIRCUMSTANCES DESCRIBED- For purposes of subparagraph (A), the 
circumstances described in this subparagraph are that— 
(i) the conduct described in subparagraph (A) occurs during the course of, or as 
the result of, the travel of the defendant or the victim— 
  (I) across a State line or national border; or 
  (II) using a channel, facility, or instrumentality of interstate or foreign 
commerce; 
(ii) the defendant uses a channel, facility, or instrumentality of interstate or foreign 
commerce in connection with the conduct described in subparagraph (A); 
(iii) in connection with the conduct described in subparagraph (A): the defendant 
employs a firearm, explosive or incendiary device, or other weapon that has 
traveled in interstate or foreign commerce; or 
 (iv) the conduct described in subparagraph (A)— 
(I) interferes with commercial or other economic activity in which the victim 
is engaged at the time of the conduct; or 
(II) otherwise affects interstate or foreign commerce. 
Id.  Note that religion and national origin are mentioned in both sections.  This is due to the doubt 
concerning the Thirteenth Amendment’s applicability to these types of discrimination.  See Sara 
Sue Beale, Federalizing Hate Crimes: Symbolic Politics, Expressive Law, or Tool for Criminal 
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commerce, (a)(2) requires a showing that the defendant used a channel or an 
instrumentality of interstate commerce or that the defendant engaged in an 
activity that substantially affects interstate commerce.298  Neither section 
provides a cause of action against a state or state actor. 
Included in the language of the act are several congressional findings that 
attempt to justify the legislation on Commerce Clause grounds.299  Among 
these are: that the problem of hate crime is sufficiently interstate in nature;300 
that perpetrators cross state lines to commit these crimes;301 that perpetrators 
use instruments that have traveled in interstate commerce to commit these 
crimes;302 and that such crimes affect interstate commerce by preventing 
members of targeted groups from traveling across state lines and from 
purchasing goods and services in the interstate market.303  The findings also 
claim federal jurisdiction under the Thirteenth Amendment.304  They claim that 
“eliminating racially motivated violence is an important means of eliminating, 
to the extent possible, the badges, incidents, and relics of slavery and 
involuntary servitude.”305 
Due to the differences between sections (a)(1) and (a)(2) in the proposed 
bill, each one would merit a unique constitutional analysis.  Therefore, the 
following discussion looks at sections (a)(1) and (a)(2) separately.  This 
Comment examines whether (a)(1) or (a)(2) can be supported under the 
Commerce Clause or under the Thirteenth Amendment as the findings claim.  
Furthermore, it shows why the Fourteenth Amendment would not apply. 
B. Constitutionality of the Legislation 
1. Section (a)(1) 
As discussed above, the Lopez-Morrison test divides Congress’s 
Commerce Clause power into three categories: authority to regulate the 
channels of interstate commerce, authority to regulate instruments or things in 
interstate commerce, and authority to regulate activities that have a substantial 
 
Enforcement?, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1227, 1235 n.27 (2000).  The bill’s drafters contend that religion 
and national origin should be considered “races” for purposes of the Thirteenth Amendment.  S. 
19, 107th Cong. § 102(11) (2001). 
 298. S. 19, 107th Cong. § 107(a) (2001). 
 299. Id. § 102. 
 300. Id. § 102(1). 
 301. Id. § 102(7). 
 302. Id. § 102(9). 
 303. S. 19, 107th Cong. § 102(6) (2001). 
 304. Id. § 102(10). 
 305. Id. 
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effect on interstate commerce.306  For (a)(1) to be constitutional under the 
Commerce Clause, it must fit into one of these three categories. 
First, it will likely be uncontested that the legislation does not fall under 
the first category.  Courts have defined the channels of interstate commerce as 
“‘navigable rivers, lakes, and canals of the United States; the interstate railroad 
track system; . . . interstate telephone and telegraph lines; air traffic routes; 
television and radio broadcast frequencies.’”307  To fall under this category, the 
law must regulate these channels directly rather than regulate an activity that 
merely “implicates” or “invokes” the use of these channels.308  Clearly, the 
hate crime bill speaks to none of these channels directly. 
Likewise, the act does not regulate a thing or instrument in interstate 
commerce.  Under this category, the mere character of the activities sought to 
be regulated makes them the subject of federal regulation.309  Vehicles used to 
transport goods across state lines fall within this category,310 as does money 
deposited in a federally insured bank.311  An “instrumentality” can also be an 
intangible item, such as a debt.312  Although Congress has found that 
instrumentalities of interstate commerce are used in hate crimes,313 (a)(1) 
regulates the behavior, not the instruments themselves.  Interpersonal human 
behavior is clearly distinguishable from commercial objects or debts.  Thus, 
the act cannot draw its authority under the second Lopez-Morrison category 
and must pass the four-factor “substantial effects” test if it is to be 
constitutional. 
Clearly the first factor, the nature of the activity regulated, will be 
troublesome for (a)(1).  The activity sought to be regulated, causing or 
threatening bodily injury, does not appear to be any more economic in nature 
than rape or carrying a gun near a school.  Courts have been liberal in 
classifying an activity as “economic” by including those activities that are not 
economic in themselves, but which are part of a larger federal scheme to 
regulate interstate commerce.314  But it is still unlikely that this expansive 
definition of “economic activity” will encompass the activity regulated in 
(a)(1).  The purpose behind the legislation is not economic; it is to protect the 
safety of citizens. 
 
 306. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608-09 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 
U.S 549, 558-59 (1995). 
 307. Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 490-91 (4th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Miles, 
122 F.3d 235, 245 (5th Cir. 1997)). 
 308. United States v. Faasse, 227 F.3d 660, 668 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 309. United States v. Owens, 159 F.3d 221, 226 (6th Cir. 1998). 
 310. See, e.g., United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569, 588 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 311. See Owens, 159 F.3d at 226. 
 312. See United States v. Sage, 92 F.3d 101, 105 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 313. S. 19, 107th Cong. § 102(8) (2001). 
 314. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 600 (1995). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1008 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 45:973 
The second factor, the jurisdictional element, is absent in this section.  The 
third factor, congressional findings, is present, but as the Court concluded in 
Morrison, this alone will not be enough to demonstrate a statute’s 
constitutionality.  In any case, the findings supporting this legislation are 
nowhere near as voluminous as those supporting the VAWA. 
The fourth factor, the attenuation of the link, also weighs heavily against 
this section’s constitutionality.  This is especially true if a court adopts the 
proper reading of Morrison and considers the statute’s potential infringement 
into areas of traditional state concern.  Indeed, the Court stated in Morrison 
that it could think of “no better example” of a power reserved for the states 
“than the suppression of violent crime and vindication of its victims.”315  The 
hate crime bill goes even further than § 13981 in seeking to suppress violent 
crime because it is a criminal rather than a civil statute. 
By comparing (a)(1) with the unconstitutional § 13981, a court would 
discover that (a)(1) has an equally weak showing of the first two factors, and 
an equal or lesser showing under the third and fourth factors.  The only logical 
conclusion to draw from this analysis is that (a)(1), like § 13981, cannot be 
supported under the Commerce Clause. 
Section (a)(1) also cannot be valid under Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Despite the fact that (a)(1) seeks to protect discrimination 
against so-called “suspect” classes, Morrison made it clear that congressional 
action under Section 5 must be aimed at a state or state actor.  Proponents of 
the legislation may try to argue that (a)(1) is aimed at the states in that it acts as 
a remedy for people who are not being protected under state law.  This 
argument, however, is unlikely to succeed.  The Supreme Court has previously 
stated that Congress’s power under the Fourteenth Amendment does not reach 
a state’s failure to act.316  Furthermore, the hate crime bill is not limited to 
those states in which hate crimes are not being prosecuted.  The Morrison 
decision indicated that one of the flaws of § 13981 was that it applied to all 
states, even those that were effective in handling gender-motivated violence.317  
The hate crime bill would face an even steeper battle on this front, since there 
is little evidence showing that states have been lax in prosecuting hate 
crimes.318 
 
 315. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 (2000). 
 316. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Soc. Servs. Dept., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989) 
(stating that the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment is “to protect the people from the State, 
not to ensure that the State [protects] them from each other”). 
 317. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 626-27. 
 318. Senator Orrin Hatch argued this point in the Senate hate crimes debates in June 2000. 
146 CONG. REC. S5426 (daily ed. June 20, 2000).  Senator Hatch sponsored a bill that would have 
required a comprehensive analysis to determine whether states were failing or refusing to 
prosecute hate crimes to the full extent of the law.  S. 1406, 106th Cong. (1999); 146 CONG. REC. 
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The Thirteenth Amendment is the only constitutional provision on which 
(a)(1) could arguably be based.319  By finding (a)(1) constitutional under the 
Thirteenth Amendment, a court would avoid the “state action” roadblock that 
hinders federal action under the Fourteenth Amendment.  The Supreme Court 
unambiguously held in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.320 that the Thirteenth 
Amendment reaches private actors.321  As noted above, one court has even 
ruled, albeit over a century ago, that the Amendment allows Congress to 
prosecute people who commit crimes based on racial bias.322  A court, then, 
could reasonably conclude that (a)(1) is an appropriate congressional means to 
eliminate the “badges and incidents of slavery.” 
It is not certain, however, that (a)(1) would survive under a Thirteenth 
Amendment analysis.  At least three problems arise.  First, although courts 
have recognized that the Amendment addresses discrimination against blacks, 
it is still unclear whether the Amendment can also be used to eliminate the 
wide categories of discrimination listed in (a)(1).  Although the Supreme Court 
has implied that the Amendment reaches other forms of racial discrimination 
and may also reach discrimination based on religion, the Court has never come 
to a clear conclusion on these matters.323  Thus, there is room for 
interpretation, and it cannot be said that a court must find that the Thirteenth 
Amendment allows Congress to protect all groups listed in (a)(1). 
A second problem is one recognized by Professor Baker of Louisiana State 
University.324  He argued that even if a court found the hate crime bill 
constitutional under the Thirteenth Amendment, the bill would still be suspect 
under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because of its race-
based classifications.325  He concluded that the Supreme Court would be 
unwilling to approve a bill that puts two constitutional amendments in 
conflict.326 
Finally, although it may be reasonable for a court to find (a)(1) 
constitutional under the Thirteenth Amendment, it is not the necessary 
conclusion.  A court could conceivably distinguish the hate crime law from the 
statute upheld in Jones by recognizing that the former is a criminal statute 
while the latter provides a civil remedy.  Also, a court seeking to reject the 
 
S5425.  The Senate approved his amendment on the same day it approved Senator Kennedy’s 
proposal.  146 CONG. REC. S5425-28. 
 319. See Baker, supra note 9, at 1220. 
 320. 392 U.S. 409 (1968). 
 321. Id. at 439. 
 322. See United States v. Cruikshank, 25 F. Cas. 707 (C.C.D. La. 1874) and supra text 
accompanying notes -. 
 323. See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text. 
 324. Baker, supra note 9, at 1220-21. 
 325. Id. at 1220. 
 326. Id. at 1221. 
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Thirteenth Amendment basis could look to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
United States v. Cruikshank,327 which declined to confirm the lower court’s 
conclusion that the Amendment reaches criminal prosecutions of race-based 
violence.328  Although these arguments may not be overly convincing, they 
show that it is at least possible for a court to find (a)(1) to be beyond 
Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment authority. 
Given that a court can reasonably take either path with respect to (a)(1)’s 
validity under the Thirteenth Amendment, it seems highly unlikely that a 
ruling of constitutionality would survive an appeal to the current Supreme 
Court.  The trend among recent Supreme Court decisions clearly has been in 
favor of state autonomy at the expense of federal power.329  Thus, given two 
options, the Court would be inclined to choose the one that limits federal 
authority.  It is hard to imagine the current Supreme Court opening the doors 
for a new avenue of federal power, especially one that could have far-reaching 
effects. 
Thus, section (a)(1), in its current form, cannot be justified under the 
Commerce Clause due to its lack of a jurisdictional element and due to the fact 
that it is a criminal statute that does not seek to regulate an economic activity.  
The section also cannot be justified under Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, since it is not directed at a state or state actor.  Finally, section 
(a)(1) might be justifiable under the Thirteenth Amendment, at least with 
respect to certain forms of discrimination, but it is unlikely that the Supreme 
Court will look with favor on such an interpretation. 
2. Section (a)(2) 
Section (a)(2) differs from (a)(1) in two respects.  First, (a)(2) protects 
against three forms of discrimination—discrimination based on sexual 
orientation, gender and age—which have neither been classified by the courts 
as “suspect classifications” nor been suggested by the courts to fall under the 
purview of the Thirteenth Amendment.330  Second, this subsection contains a 
jurisdictional element, limiting its application to matters involving interstate 
 
 327. 92 U.S. 542 (1875) 
 328. Id. at 553. 
 329. See. e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 67 (2000) (holding that states are 
immune from federal lawsuits filed under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Printz v. 
United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (forbidding the federal government from requiring state 
law enforcement officers to enforce federal handgun regulations). 
 330. Case law indicates that the Thirteenth Amendment could cover discrimination against 
national origin and religion, both covered in (a)(2).  See supra note 154 (discussing Shaare Tefila 
Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615 (1987)).  If this view prevails, a Thirteenth Amendment 
analysis with respect to these classes would be identical to the analysis under (a)(1).  This 
Comment’s remaining (a)(2) analysis, therefore, is limited to those types of discrimination 
beyond the reach of the Thirteenth Amendment. 
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commerce.  It is clear that the drafters of the bill intended (a)(2) to fall 
exclusively under Congress’s Commerce Clause power. 
Because (a)(2) is identical to (a)(1) in all other respects, it is unnecessary 
to replay the analysis under the first two categories of the Lopez-Morrison test.  
It is apparent that (a)(2), like (a)(1), cannot be justified under either the 
“channels” or “instrumentalities” categories.  The jurisdictional element in 
(a)(2), however, would significantly change the “substantial effects” analysis.  
The question, then, is whether this jurisdictional element would be enough to 
uphold (a)(2) as constitutional. 
It seems a court could take one of two paths on this issue.  It could either 
follow the Visnich approach, which emphasized the importance of the 
jurisdictional element factor,331 or it could follow the Sixth Circuit’s 
interpretation in Faasse, which held that a jurisdictional element is not enough 
in the face of a strong showing of non-economic nature and an infringement 
into state matters.332  It is unclear at this point which path is more consistent 
with current Commerce Clause jurisprudence.  Reasonable arguments can be 
made on both sides. 
In support of the Faasse approach, one could argue the point made by 
Chief Justice Rehnquist in Morrison, that the Supreme Court has never used 
aggregation under the “substantial effects” test to uphold a law that was not 
economic in nature.333  In contrast, the Court has repeatedly upheld laws that 
lacked either a jurisdictional element or express congressional findings.  If one 
assumes that Heart of Atlanta and McClung are still good law, then one could 
reasonably conclude that the economic nature of the activity is the key factor.  
The statute at issue in those cases had neither a jurisdictional element nor 
support from formal congressional findings, yet both regulated economic 
activity, and thus both were constitutional.334 
Another argument in support of the Faasse approach is the language used 
by the Court in Morrison.  The contrast between the discussion of the 
economic nature and the discussion of the jurisdictional element is striking.  
Although § 13981 was lacking in both elements, the Court emphasized that the 
non-economic nature of the regulated activity was “central” to the Court’s 
analysis.335  The Court went out of its way to emphasize that “thus far in our 
Nation’s history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of 
 
 331. United States v. Visnich, 109 F. Supp. 2d 757 (N.D. Ohio 2000).  For an explanation of 
the term “Visnich approach,” see supra note 277. 
 332. United States v. Faasse, 227 F.3d 660, 670 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 333. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 611 (2000). 
 334. See also Groome Res. Ltd. v. Parish of Jefferson, 234 F.3d 192, 211 (5th Cir. 2000) 
(finding the Fair Housing Amendments Act constitutional under the Commerce Clause because 
even though the statute lacks a jurisdictional element, it regulates an economic activity). 
 335. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1012 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 45:973 
intrastate activity only where that activity is economic in nature.”336  On the 
other hand, the best the Court could say about the jurisdictional element is that 
it “may” establish constitutionality, or that it would “lend support” to such a 
position.337 
If a court follows the Faasse conclusion that the jurisdictional element 
factor is only a minor one, it would not be surprising if the court found (a)(2) 
unconstitutional in spite of its jurisdictional element.  As shown above in the 
discussion of (a)(1), the minor factors of a jurisdictional element and 
congressional findings would be far outweighed by a particularly weak 
showing of the two major factors: the nature of the activity regulated and the 
attenuation of the link to interstate commerce. 
It is not altogether clear, though, that the Faasse approach is the proper 
one.  For one, as mentioned above, the Faasse decision was vacated.338  
Furthermore, it had expressed a minority position with respect to the 
constitutionality of the Child Support Recovery Act.  In Faasse, the Sixth 
Circuit departed from the decisions of the Third, Fifth and Ninth Circuits, 
which found the same statute to be valid under the Commerce Clause.339 
Opponents of the Faasse approach can also find support in the language of 
the Morrison decision.  While the Court did recognize that it never upheld a 
regulation of intrastate non-economic activity under the Commerce Clause, the 
Court also stated, in the same sentence, that “we need not adopt a categorical 
rule against aggregating the effects of any non economic activity in order to 
decide these cases . . . .”340  This indicates that the Court was unwilling to do 
away with the “minor” Lopez factors and to let the “economic nature” factor 
bear the entire burden. 
Another argument against applying the Faasse approach is that the 
jurisdictional element found to be insufficient in that case is significantly 
different than the one found in (a)(2).  The Child Support Recovery Act’s 
jurisdictional element only requires that the parent live in a different state from 
the child.  As the Faasse court pointed out, the Act has the “interstate” part but 
is lacking the “commerce” part.341  In contrast, (a)(2) requires that either the 
defendant or victim have traveled in interstate or foreign commerce, have used 
a facility or instrumentality of interstate or foreign commerce, or have engaged 
in any activity otherwise affecting interstate or foreign commerce.342  This 
jurisdictional element is strikingly similar to the one found in the federal 
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firearms statute, which the Supreme Court, in Lopez, used as an example of a 
valid jurisdictional element.343 Furthermore, the Faasse court even 
acknowledged that if the jurisdictional element of the Child Support Recovery 
Act had been more limiting, it might have withstood constitutional scrutiny.344 
Therefore, it is possible that (a)(2)’s jurisdictional element would be 
enough to uphold it under the Commerce Clause.  But even if a court found it 
facially constitutional, the question remains as to what sort of jurisdictional 
“hook” would need to be shown to pass constitutional muster.  Taking the 
Matthew Shepard case as an example, would it have been enough if the 
prosecution could prove that the kidnappers drove Shepard in a car that had 
traveled in interstate commerce, or that they had used an interstate highway, or 
that they had used the telephone to plan the attack? 
The case law is unclear on where to draw the line, if a line does indeed 
exist, between constitutional jurisdictional elements and unconstitutional ones.  
The prevailing view is that when a jurisdictional element invokes the full 
power under the Commerce Clause, a party need only show a “de minimis” 
connection with interstate commerce.345  For example, in order to convict 
under the federal firearms statute, a prosecutor only needs to show that the 
defendant’s gun traveled in interstate commerce at some point in time.346  
Lower courts, however, have had difficulty determining when this “de 
minimis” test has been satisfied, especially when the prosecution must show a 
“de minimis” effect on interstate commerce.  Two cases involving the federal 
Hobbs Act illustrate this point.347  In United States v. Bailey,348 the Seventh 
Circuit found that an attempted robbery of a cocaine dealer satisfied the act’s 
jurisdictional element.349  The court reasoned that the money the defendant 
attempted to rob would have been used by the dealer to purchase cocaine, 
which is an article of interstate commerce.350  In contrast, the Sixth Circuit, in 
United States v. Wang,351 found the nexus was not established in the robbery of 
a restaurant owner, even though the money taken was intended by the 
restaurateur to be used to purchase goods in interstate commerce. 352 
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This confusion also has arisen in cases involving the federal arson statute.  
The Ninth Circuit held that the fact that a torched house had once received gas 
from interstate commerce was not sufficient to satisfy the jurisdictional 
element of the statute.353  In United States v. Jones,354 the Seventh Circuit 
disagreed with its sister court on this particular issue.355  The Supreme Court 
had the chance to settle the dispute when it granted certiorari to the Jones 
case.356  However, the Court sidestepped the constitutional question by finding 
that the jurisdictional element in the federal arson statute is limited to buildings 
that are “used” in interstate commerce, not ones that “affect” interstate 
commerce, which, the Court said, would have invoked the full extent of 
Commerce Clause authority.357  Because (a)(2)’s jurisdictional element extends 
to activities that “affect” interstate commerce, it does invoke the full power of 
the Commerce Clause, and thus Jones would be of no help in drawing the line. 
Jones was decided one week after Morrison.  This would seem to suggest 
that the Court was sending out the message that its Lopez-Morrison 
“substantial effects” standard would apply only to facial challenges to federal 
laws, and not to determinations of jurisdictional elements.  The Ninth Circuit 
apparently adopted this interpretation.  It stated that it was “not prepared to say 
the teachings of Morrison apply to statutes . . . that do contain a precise 
statement of a jurisdictional element.”358  Other circuits have adopted this 
approach as well.359  These courts seem to conclude that two different tests 
should be used: a broad one when determining whether a jurisdictional element 
is satisfied, and a more narrow one when determining whether a Commerce 
Clause regulation is constitutional on its face. 
The Sixth Circuit, however, seems to have shied away from this 
interpretation.  In the Wang case, the court, when looking for a “substantial 
effect” under a jurisdictional nexus, gave regard to the Lopez Court’s 
admonition against piling “inference upon inference” in order to find an effect 
on commerce.360  On the other hand, the Wang court did make it clear that “the 
de minimis standard . . . survived Lopez.”361  The Sixth Circuit even re-
emphasized this point in United States v. Carmichael,362 decided after 
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Morrison, when it stated that “even a very minimal connection to interstate 
commerce is sufficient” to satisfy a jurisdictional element.363  A more recent 
Sixth Circuit case, however, seems to have departed from the Carmichael 
approach.  In United States v. Corp,364 the court recognized that “Morrison and 
Lopez have required that the jurisdictional components of constitutional 
statutes are to be read as meaningful restrictions.”365  The defendant in Corp 
was charged with producing and possessing pornographic photographs of a 
minor in violation of federal law.366  The court concluded that the defendant’s 
use of photographic paper that was manufactured out-of-state was not enough 
to bring him under federal jurisdiction.367  Although the Corp court declined to 
find the child pornography statute facially unconstitutional, the court did find 
that the statute’s jurisdictional element was unconstitutionally broad when 
applied to the defendant.368  It is important to note that unlike the Supreme 
Court’s opinion in Jones, the Sixth Circuit in Corp did not frame its argument 
as a matter of statutory construction but rather found constitutional defects in 
the statute as written. While the Corp decision did not go so far as to eliminate 
the “de minimis” test altogether, the Sixth Circuit at least has given more 
regard to Lopez and Morrison than has its sister courts. 
The Sixth Circuit has started down the correct path, but it has not gone far 
enough.  Common sense dictates that the “de minimis” test be put to rest 
entirely.  Lopez and Morrison have clearly shown that Congress must show 
more than a “de minimis” link to interstate commerce to support a statute on its 
face.  It is only logical, then, that a party must also show more than a “de 
minimis” link in order to satisfy a jurisdictional element.  To reason otherwise 
would lead to bizarre conclusions.  For example, say that the VAWA did 
contain a jurisdictional element that required the plaintiff to show that a sexual 
assault “affected” interstate commerce.  This would force the plaintiff to 
recycle the same arguments that Congress made in its findings: that the crime 
discouraged the plaintiff from traveling in interstate commerce, reduced her 
employment opportunities, increased her health expenditures, and reduced her 
consumer spending.  This would seem to be enough to satisfy many circuits’ 
idea of a “de minimis” test, although it is clearly not enough to satisfy the 
“substantial effects” test under Morrison.  Thus, failing to equate the two tests 
would allow an end-run around Morrison, by allowing plaintiffs (or 
prosecutors) to use the same attenuated links to interstate commerce that 
Congress is now prohibited to use. 
 
 363. Id. at 516. 
 364. 236 F.3d 325 (6th Cir. 2001). 
 365. Id. at 332 (emphasis added). 
 366. Id. at 326-27. 
 367. Id. at 326, 333. 
 368. Id. at 332-33. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1016 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 45:973 
Therefore, while it is possible that (a)(2) may be facially constitutional 
thanks to its jurisdictional element, a court, in order to be consistent with Lopez 
and Morrison, would have to require a prosecutor to show a stronger link to 
interstate commerce than what has traditionally been accepted.  Stacking 
“inference upon inference” is no longer an option.  Thus, proving the 
jurisdictional element of a hate crime would not be the mere formality the 
bill’s proponents expect it to be.  Instead, it could be a significant hindrance 
and could render (a)(2) a criminal statute without teeth. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
It is apparent that the Local Law Enforcement Enhancement Act of 2001 
will run into constitutional problems under the Commerce Clause and under 
the Fourteenth and Thirteenth Amendments.  The Morrison decision shows 
that (a)(1) cannot be justified under the Commerce Clause due to its non-
economic nature and lack of a jurisdictional element.  Precedent could lead a 
court to uphold (a)(1) under the Thirteenth Amendment.  However, it is 
unlikely that the Supreme Court would adopt such an interpretation.  
Furthermore, while (a)(2) may arguably be constitutional under the Commerce 
Clause, Morrison requires that prosecutors show a strong connection to 
interstate commerce rather than just a vague relation.  Finally, Morrison shows 
that neither (a)(1) nor (a)(2) can be justified under the Fourteenth Amendment 
since neither addresses state actions. 
Morrison further shows that the obvious trend in the Supreme Court is to 
limit federal power.  Perhaps Morrison’s greatest significance is that it proved 
that Lopez was not an anomaly but rather was a shift in paradigm.369  Though it 
seems unlikely that this current trend will create a complete reversal of almost 
a century of Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the Court so far has been more 
than willing to extend its new Commerce Clause attack on recently adopted 
laws.  Federal laws like drug laws have gained general acceptance, and 
upsetting them would cause a dramatic shake-up of a massive federal 
bureaucracy.  Contrast this with the Gun-Free School Zones Act and the 
VAWA’s civil remedy provision, which the Court quickly killed before they 
could become part of the national culture.  Therefore, absent a change in the 
population of the Supreme Court, an infant hate crime statute would not stand 
a chance. 
Hate crimes are indeed a prevalent problem in the United States, and 
Senator Kennedy and civil rights activists should be commended for at least 
addressing the problem.  Federalizing all hate crimes, however, is not the 
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answer.  The hate crime bill pending in the Senate would extend the long arm 
of federal jurisdiction into areas never before imagined.  Its broad “threat of 
force” language could make a squabble between a husband and wife or a 
schoolyard fistfight matters for the FBI.  The legislation would not only blur 
the line between state and federal jurisdiction; it would erase it entirely. 
For more than two centuries, fighting local crime has been a matter for 
local authorities, officials who have a legitimate stake in whether perpetrators 
are brought to justice.  Federal agents have no such motivation.370  This is why 
the Founding Fathers wisely chose to limit federal authority to specific 
enumerated powers.  It is unfortunate that Congress, and often the courts, 
forget this fact. 
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